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KATZ, KYLLO, AND TECHNOLOGY:
VIRTUAL FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
Tracey Maclin"
INTRODUCTION

The freedoms established in the Bill of Rights-including
the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
governmental searches and seizures-were meant to endure.
Advances in science and technology recurrently exert pressure
on the scope and meaning of the Fourth Amendment,1 but the
privacy and security protected by the Fourth Amendment
should not depend on innovations in technology. "When the
American Republic was founded, the framers established a libertarian equilibrium among the competing values of privacy,
disclosure, and surveillance. This balance was based on the
technological realities of eighteenth-century life."2 During the
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I want to thank Tom
Clancy for inviting me to speak at the University of Mississippi School of Law
and to attend a symposium entitled, The Effect of Technology on Fourth
Amendment Analysis and Individual Rights. I also want to thank the National
Center for Justice and the Rule of Law at the University of Mississippi School of
Law that is supported by a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of
Justice Programs, of the U.S. Department of Justice, for its generous support of
this article. Finally, I thank Jill Marr for her research assistance.
' As Justice Scalia notes: "It would be foolish to contend that the degree of
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected
by the advance of technology." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001);
see also Raymond Shin Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment
and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1344 (2002)
(arguing that "[flrom the beginning, the Supreme Court has taken a narrow view
of the Fourth Amendment's role in limiting government discretion to employ novel
technologies'); Thomas K Clancy, What Does The Fourth Amendment Protect:
Property, Privacy, or Security, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 335 (1998) (noting
that the "overall tendency of the Court has been to contract the protected individual interest as a consequence of modern technological advances and their utilization by the government').
I ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 67 (1967).
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Framers' era, the home was the focal point of privacy and
personal security.3 The Fourth Amendment proscribed intrusions into a home unless a government official obtained a
judicial warrant supported by specific procedural safeguards. 4
With the increased use of technology in the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court confronted search and seizure
questions never imagined by the Framers. During the firsthalf of the twentieth century, Fourth Amendment liberties
typically fared poorly under the pressure of a technologically
advancing society. For example, police investigative methods
adapted to deal with the mobility of cars when automobile
travel became accessible to many people. In 1925, the Court
ruled a warrantless search of a car and its contents is reasonable, provided there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.5 Three years later, the Court ruled
the Fourth Amendment did not encompass police wiretapping
of telephone conversations. The Court explained wiretapping
involves neither a search nor seizure within the meaning of
the Amendment, 6 and that "one who installs in his house a
telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project
his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his
house and messages while passing over them are not within
the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment."7 By the 1950's,
pressure mounted, on and off the Court, to reconsider whether
the Amendment's protective scope excluded wiretapping. Notwithstanding the criticism of its wiretapping ruling, in 1952
the Court held that use of a "wired spy" to capture the conver-

' See, e.g., DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 45
(1967).
" See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 551 (1999) ("The historical statements about search and seizure focused on condemning general warrants. In fact, the historical concerns
were almost exclusively about the need to ban house searches under general warrants.').
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
6Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). Olmstead explained
that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid wiretapping. "There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of
hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
Id. at 466.
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sations of the defendant and a government informant who
surreptitiously recorded them did not trigger Fourth Amendment protection.8 The Court, however, scoffed at the notion
that police use of a wired informant is akin to police wiretapping.9
Although the Court gave the police wide discretion to
utilize technology to investigate individuals during the first
half of the twentieth century,'0 the Court transformed its
analytical approach toward electronic surveillance in the mid1960's. First, the Court rejected its earlier conclusion that oral
communications were not covered by the Fourth Amendment." The Court then decided three cases which demonstrated a dramatic shift in the Justices' thoughts about electronic surveillance methods. Having previously determined
that law enforcement officials .could freely use wiretapping
and wired informants without constitutional restraint, by 1967

On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952).
On Lee, 343 U.S. at 754. The On Lee Court asserted: "It would be a dubious service to the genuine liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment to make
them bedfellows with spurious liberties improvised by farfetched analogies which
would liken eavesdropping on a conversation, with the connivance of one of the
parties, to an unreasonable search or seizure." Id.
10 In cases where electronic surveillance constituted a physical trespass or entry into a constitutionally protected area, Fourth Amendment safeguards were
imposed. Compare Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961) (use of
a "spike mike"-which is a device that made contact with a heating duct serving
the house occupied by the defendants-was "an unauthorized physical penetration"
of the premises, and thus a search under the Fourth Amendment), with Goldman
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (use of a detectaphone-which captures
sound waves-placed against the wall of an office in order to overhear conversations in an adjoining office was no search because there was no physical trespass
of the targeted office).
" Olmstead concluded that oral communications were not protected by the
Fourth Amendment. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. This conclusion was later rejected
in Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 (finding a Fourth Amendment violation because
'the officers overheard the petitioners' conversations only by usurping part of the
petitioners' house or office" without judicial authorization) and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (explaining that Silverman recognizes that
"the Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements
as well as against the more traditional seizure of 'papers and effects."'). Cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 775 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that
Wong Sun "expressly brought verbal communications within the sweep of the
Fourth Amendment").
'
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the Court reversed course and ruled that judicial approval was
a pre-condition to validate electronic surveillance.
In the first case, Osborn v. United States, 2 the Court
approved a judicial order authorizing a tape recording of an
attorney's conversation with a government informant. A detailed affidavit alleged that the attorney attempted to bribe a
juror."3 The Osborn Court specifically noted that the challenged electronic surveillance involved police monitoring "under the most precise and discriminate circumstances." 4
Osborn was an unusual case because government agents had
sought judicial approval before undertaking electronic monitoring. Thus, Osborn was an unlikely precedent to affect major
change in the way law enforcement officials conducted electronic surveillance. The discerning reader, however, would
recognize that Osborn signaled the Justices' discomfort with
previous rulings upholding electronic surveillance. 5
While Osborn may not have caught the attention of law
enforcement officials, a second case, Berger v. New York, 6
was a bombshell for the police. Berger invalidated New York's
electronic surveillance statute. The Court found that the elec-

12

385 U.S. 323 (1966).

3 Osborn, 385 U.S. at 328.
14 Id. at 329.

"' Prior to Osborn, in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), the Court

upheld the admission of testimony of an Internal Revenue agent's conversation
with a defendant who had tried to bribe the agent and a tape recording of that
conversation that was captured by a pocket recorder worn by the agent. Lopez,
373 U.S. at 440. The Lopez Court ruled that no unconstitutional invasion of
Lopez's office occurred because the agent had the defendant's "consent, and while
there [the agent] did not violate the privacy of the office by seizing something
surreptitiously without petitioner's knowledge." Id. at 438. Four members of the
Lopez Court wanted to overrule On Lee. See id. at 441-43 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (arguing that On Lee should be overruled, but distinguishing facts in Lopez
from On Lee because the use and purpose of the electronic recording equipment
in On Lee "was not to corroborate the testimony of the [government informant],
but rather, to obviate the need to put him on the stand"); see id. at 446-53
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that On Lee and Lopez are indistinguishable).
The Osborn majority avoided the debate that was left unsettled in Lopez "because
it is evident that the circumstances under which the tape recording was obtained
in this case fall within the narrower compass of the Lopez concurring and dissenting opinions." Osborn, 385 U.S. at 327.
16 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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tronic surveillance that the statute authorized contained numerous constitutional flaws. 7 Beyond the specific constitutional objections that the majority listed, some of the Berger
Court's harsh language condemning the New York statute
"left the dissenting Justices (and many others) wondering
whether any wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping statute
could pass constitutional muster."8
Finally, Katz v. United States,9 decided a year after
Osborn, eliminated any lingering uncertainty about the constitutional validity of unchecked police wiretapping. Katz held
that FBI agents violated the Fourth Amendment when, without judicial authorization, they attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public telephone
booth that the defendant used.2' Katz was a landmark
case." The ruling not only solidified the Court's view that the
Constitution required judicial supervision of electronic surveillance, it also "purported to clean house on outmoded [Flourth
[A]mendment principles."' Moreover, in the view of many,
the impact of Katz was "to expand rather than generally to
reconstruct the boundaries of [Flourth [A]mendment protec-

17 Berger, 388 U.S. at 56, 58-59. Berger explained that the statute was uncon-

stitutional because first, "[it lays down no requirement for particularity in the
warrant as to what specific crime has been or is being committed, nor 'the place
to be searched,' or 'the persons or things to be seized' as specifically required by
the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 56; see also id. at 58-59. Second, the statute authorized surveillance "for a two-month period [which] is the equivalent of a series
of intrusions, searches and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable
cause" and permitted extensions of surveillance on "a mere showing that such
extension is 'in the public interest. Id. at 59. Third, the statute "places no termination date on the eavesdrop once the conversation sought is seized. This is
left entirely in the discretion of the officer." Id. at 59-60. Finally, the statute did
not require prompt return on the warrant "thereby leaving full discretion in the
officer as to the use of seized conversations of innocent as well as guilty parties."
Id. at 60.
I8 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, CoMMENTs AND
QUESTIONS 352-53 (10th ed. 2002).
19 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
21 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(b), at 385 (3d ed.
1996).
" Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968, 975 (1968).
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tion."2 Put simply, the holding and logic of Katz was revolutionary. Katz moved the Court "toward a redefinition of the
scope of the [F]ourth [A]mendment." 4 The passage of time,
however, would show that Katz would do little to protect
Fourth Amendment liberties.
The technological advances of the twenty-first century will
present new, and sometimes more challenging, issues as judges grapple with the question of how much privacy and security
the Fourth Amendment provides.2 5 At the start of this new
century, the Court decided Kyllo v. United States,26 which in
"3 Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REv. 349, 385 (1974).
Edmund W. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 SUp. CT. REV. 133, 133; see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim
of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by the Open Fields
Doctrine) 48 Prrr. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1986) (explaining how Katz tends to redefine
the scope of the Fourth Amendment); Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy
and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1, 6 n.12 (1983) (explaining how
Katz ties the right to privacy to "changing cultural expectations" of privacy). Cf
David A. Sklansky, Back To The Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS.
L.J. 143, 145 (2002) (describing Katz as "perhaps the most influential search-andseizure decision of the past half-century").
2
Cf Susan Bandes, Power, Privacy and Thermal Imaging, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1379, 1383 (2002) ("On a more basic level, technology advances pose the challenges that always beset the constitutional enterprise-those involved with trying to
create fixed rules, or at least a workable rule of law, for a changing world. In
this regard, technology illustrates the problem with trying to rely on fixed understandings of how the world works."); Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv.
61, 70 (2000) (noting the danger "that courts will rigidly adhere to outdated
Fourth Amendment concepts which are ill-suited to cyberspace, leading to the
conclusion that Web users lack legitimate expectations of privacy in clicktream
data"). Occasionally, the key to resolving an emerging issue of the twenty-first
century requires application of traditional constitutional doctrine. For example,
Professor Orin Kerr has noted that "[ajlthough the Internet is a recent development with great promise for revolutionary change, the Fourth Amendment questions raised by encrypting Internet communications are decades (if not centuries)
old." Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create
a "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?" 33 CoNN. L. REv. 503, 532 (2001). In an
insightful article, Professor Kerr contends that encryption cannot create a constitutionally protected privacy interest, and government efforts to unscramble an
encrypted communication do not constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 517-24. Professor Kerr predicts that in resolving this issue, judges
will ultimately discover that the Fourth Amendment issue raised by encryption
"involve[s] old wine in new bottles." Id. at 532.
26 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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tone and substance resembles Katz. Kyllo ruled that a thermal
imaging device directed at a home constituted a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." The Court explained that a search occurs when government agents use
sense-enhancing technology to collect any information regarding the interior of a home that could not otherwise be obtained
without a physical invasion, "at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use."' Like
Katz, Kyllo is an important case for assessing the Court's
current thinking on the interplay of technology and the Fourth
Amendment. Kyllo's long-term impact on search and seizure
doctrine, however, remains uncertain.
In a thoughtful and well-reasoned article, Professor David
Sklansky states that Kyllo is likely to be one of the "touchstones" for the Court when it decides future cases involving
the government's ability to use technology to gather information and fight terrorism.29 According to Professor Sklansky,
"lelven before [the] September 11 [terrorist attacks] . . . , it
was apparent that Kyllo had significance beyond its narrow

2

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.

at 34. Kyllo's holding is announced in two different places in Justice
Scalia's opinion. See id. ("We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area'
constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use.") (citation omitted); id. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a 'search.'"). As Professor Christopher Slobogin perceptively explains, although Kyllo's holding expands Fourth Amendment protection to include
thermal imaging, it also shrinks the constitutional protection afforded private
homes by codifying a "naked eye" exception to the warrant requirement. See
Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing
Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1393, 1410 (2002) (explaining that, taken together, Kyllo's holdings "announce that
if the activity observed could be seen with the naked eye without physical intrusion into the constitutionally protected areas of home or curtilage, then police
may exploit any technology-generally used or not-without implicating the Fourth
Amendment."); id. at 1414 (noting that Kyllo "holds that enhanced searches of the
home are permissible if they merely duplicate naked eye searches from vantage
points that are not constitutionally protected").
29 Sklansky, supra note 24, at 144.
" Id.
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holding and beyond its value as a curiosity."3 ° While I agree
with much of Professor Sklansky's analysis of Kyllo, I do not
share his view that Kyllo's analytical framework will be a
"touchstone [" for future disputes involving technology and the
Fourth Amendment. I predict that Kyllo's impact on protecting
Fourth Amendment liberties, like Katz, will be slight. Just as
the Court later confined the "right" established in Katz to a
privilege against clandestine wiretapping and electronic bugging without judicial supervision,3 1 the Court is likely to construe the "right" announced in Kyllo narrowly. In other words,
Kyllo, like Katz, will not prevent police officials from using
other types of technology to monitor and discover information
helpful to law enforcement interests.
Part I of this article briefly discusses the similarities
between Katz and Kyllo. This section describes the common
traits shared by Katz and Kyllo: both cases were immediately
recognized as important rulings, both cases signaled a shift or
readjustment of Fourth Amendment law, and both cases rest
on a simple, but persuasive logic about the scope of protection
provided by the Fourth Amendment. Part II analyzes the
substance of the Katz ruling and considers the long-term impact of Katz for protecting Fourth Amendment rights against
technological innovations. This section contends that Katz has
failed to protect Fourth Amendment rights for two reasons.
First, Katz was a ruling without substance. Second, the Justices who decided Katz were unable to agree on the meaning of
their ruling, which made it easier for future Justices to ignore
the relevance of Katz in subsequent cases concerning the
reach of the Fourth Amendment.
Part III considers what impact Kyllo may have on future
cases involving technology and the Fourth Amendment. Although Kyllo's impact on Fourth Amendment liberties is uncertain at this point, this section argues that Kyllo is unlikely
to prevent government officers from using technology to monitor and reveal information. The final section of the article,
Part IV, examines how the Court might address the constitu30 Sklansky, supra note 24, at 145.

See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972).
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tional status of e-mail addressing information and whether
Carnivore's pen mode intercept constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment in a post-Kyllo world. Part IV contends
that if Carnivore's pen mode intercept is judged by the rule
announced in Kyllo, then the Court should find that this intrusion is a search. Nevertheless, Part IV concludes with the
prediction that the Court will find that Carnivore's pen mode
intercept does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
I.

THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN KATZ AND KYLLO

A. Both cases were immediately recognized
as significant rulings
Katz and Kyllo share three prominent characteristics.
First, the public and legal profession recognized both cases as
significant rulings that would impact Fourth Amendment
doctrine. Legal commentators and the press immediately recognized Katz as an important case. The press commented on
the break from the trespass rule32 and expressed surprise
that the Court was willing to uphold any electronic surveillance,' while legal commentators commented on the Court's
new methodology for determining when a search occurs.'

' Fred P. Graham, A Plug in the 'Big Ear,' N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1967, § 4,
at 10 ("Last week the Supreme Court faced up to the scientific facts of life and
held that the Fourth Amendment covers all police eavesdropping, whether accomplished by means of a trespass into private premises or not.").
"a See id. ("[That the Court added that the bugging in Katz would have been
constitutional had a search warrant been procured] caught many lawyers by surprise, because the tone of the Supreme Court's recent eavesdrop decisions has
been so hostile that people assumed the Justices would hedge police-bugging in
with so many legal technicalities that almost any useful eavesdropping would be
deemed unconstitutional."); Fred P. Graham, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1967, at Al
("[Tihe wording of the [Katz] decision erased an impression that had been created
in a decision of the Court last June that the Supreme Court would insist on such
elaborate procedures in connection with these warrants that bugging would become virtually useless as a police tool.").
'" See, e.g., Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study
of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968 (1968) (describing Katz
as a "landmark" case); id. at 981 ("[Tjhe Katz decision has pointed the way towards a complete re-orientation in the analysis of problems relating to governmental intrusion into individuals' private affairs."); id. ("Rather than relying on
an interpretation of the nature and legitimacy of the Government's searching
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Likewise, while Kyllo involved rather narrow facts, the press
and legal academics quickly noted the significance of the ruling and the possible effect the ruling could have on the
government's use of technology.35

activity, the Court's holding was based solely on the validity of the individual's
expectation of privacy. ."); Kitch, supra note 22, at 133 ("The Supreme Court is
moving toward a redefinition of the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Katz v.
United States, . . . indicates that the Court is now prepared to release the Fourth
Amendment,... from the moorings of precedent and determine its scope by the
logic of its central concepts.") (footnotes omitted).
' See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Ruling on Surveillance
Procedures; Justices Say Warrant Is Required in High-Tech Searches of Homes,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at Al (describing Kyllo as an "important declaration
of the constitutional limits on new privacy-threatening technology"); Linda Greenhouse, As Crime Ebbs, Top Court's Privacy Rulings Flow, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2001, § 4, at 16 (noting- "It is almost as if the public, liberated from the burdensome presence of crime, is free to express doubts about the civic costs of a whole
range of crime-fighting strategies, from racial profiling to high-tech eavesdropping
to low-tech drug-sniffing dogs."); David G. Savage, Court Says No to Home Snooping Law: U.S. Justices Restrict the Use of Heat Sensors and Other High-Tech Spy
Devices by Police, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at Al ("The ruling appears to put a
significant limit on the government's use of new technologies that can pick up
sounds or images inside a home .... The decision itself marked the third major
ruling this year in which the justices have rejected drug searches and put new
limits on the war on drugs."); Edward Walsh, High-Tech Devices Require a Warrant; Court: Search Violates Privacy Right, WASH. POST, June 12, 2001, at Al
('It means that the Fourth Amendment is going to apply to all the high-tech
technology that is rapidly being developed. Big Brother must now pay attention to
constitutional principles.) (quoting Steven R. Shapiro, national legal director of
the American Civil Liberties Union); cf id. ("'It is an additional step they have to
go through. The Fourth Amendment is important, privacy is important, but this
is not a blockbuster case.') (quoting Kent Scheidegger, legal director of Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation); Michelle M. Jochner, Privacy Versus Cyber-Age Police
Investigation: The Fourth Amendment in Flux, 90 ILL. BAR J. 70 (describing Kyllo
as a "landmark decision"); id. ("The Court's decision in Kyllo makes it clear that
although technology have evolved, the intent underpinning the Fourth Amendment
remains constant."). Two other commentaries have discussed Kyllo. See Sean D.
Thueson, Fuzzy Shades of Gray: The New "Bright-Line"Rule in Determining When
the Use of Technology Constitutes a Search, 2 WYo. L. REv. 169 (2002); Sarilyn E.
Hardee, Why the United States Supreme Court's Ruling in Kyllo v. United States
Is Not the Final Word on the Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 24 CAMPBELL
L. REv. 53 (2001).
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B. Both cases readjusted FourthAmendment law
Both Katz and Kyllo also signaled a shift, or readjustment, in Fourth Amendment law. Katz, authored by Justice
Stewart, explicitly rejected two concepts that previously influenced the shape of search and seizure doctrine. Prior to Katz,
a judicial finding that the challenged police action invaded a
"constitutionally protected area" was necessary to trigger the
Amendment's safeguards. 6 In their briefs to the Court, the
litigants contested whether a public telephone booth was a
constitutionally protected area. Justice Stewart, however,
found the debate unhelpful. "[Tihis effort to decide whether or
not a given 'area,' viewed in the abstract, is 'constitutionally
protected' deflects attention from the problem presented by
this case."37 At this point, Justice Stewart wrote the lines
that would symbolize the meaning and spirit of Katz:
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.'
In addition to dismissing the importance of whether the
intrusion compromised a constitutionally protected area, Katz
also rejected the rule that invocation of Fourth Amendment
protection required a physical intrusion or "trespass" by government officials. 9 Justice Stewart acknowledged that the
6 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.1(a) at 380 (explaining that what the preKatz cases "added up to, as the Supreme Court was later to put it, was that for
there to be a Fourth Amendment search the police must have physically intruded
into 'a constitutionally protected area"') (citations and footnote omitted). In Katz,
Justice Stewart acknowledged this point, although he sought to downplay the
determinative weight given in prior cases to the concept of a "constitutionally
protected area." See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, n.9 (1967) (explaining that the Court has "never suggested that this concept can serve as a
talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.").
37 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (footnote omitted).
38 Id at 351-52 (citations omitted).
39

Id.

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 72

Court's previous rulings barred constitutional scrutiny of police
intrusions in the absence of a physical penetration because the
Amendment "was thought to limit only searches and seizures of
tangible property."4' Justice Stewart, however, explained that
the "trespass" rule was no longer viable in light of the Court's
more recent rulings that the Amendment covers the seizure of
oral statements, even when a police intrusion was not a trespass under local property law. "Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach
of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence
of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 1 Thus, with
bold strokes, Katz rejected previous understandings that had
dictated the reach and meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
After Katz, the scope of the Amendment would not only be
loosened from the ancient niceties of common-law property
rules, but the substantive content of the Amendment would
derive from thoroughly modern and realistic understandings of
the privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures.4 2
Like Katz, Kyllo also represents a shift, albeit subtle, in
the Court's approach to defining what is a "search" under the
Amendment. The government contended that the thermal imaging directed at Kyllo's home was not a search because it did
not reveal any intimate details of his home.4 The Court's

40

41
4'

Id.

at 352-53 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 353.

See id. at 352 ("No less than an individual in a business office, in a

friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled
to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to
the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that
the public telephone has come to play in private communications.'). Professor Amsterdam cogently recognized that the crucial question at stake in a case like Katz
is "a value judgement." Amsterdam, supra note 23 at 403 ("The ultimate question,
plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if the particular form of surveillance
practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints,
the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to
a compass inconsistent with aims of a free and open society.").
" See Brief for the United States at 22, Kyllo (99-8508) ("This Court's deci-
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"threshold" cases seemed to support the Government's position.
Indeed, since at least 1984, the Court had strongly intimated
that police intrusions directed at homes might not trigger constitutional inquiry unless those intrusions interfered with or
revealed intimate activities associated with the home. For example, in Oliver v. United States," the Court explained that
the Amendment's protection of "houses" went beyond merely
protecting the physical interior of a home; it also protected the
curtilage of the home.4 5 Citing the common law, Oliver opined
that the curtilage "is the area to which extends the intimate
activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life,' and therefore has been considered part of the
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes."
United States v. Dunn4 7 elevated Oliver's dicta on the
meaning of curtilage to law. In Dunn, the Court adopted
Oliver's definition of curtilage and noted that a "central component of th[e] inquiry [regarding the extent of a home's curtilage
is] whether the area harbors the intimate activity associated
with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."'4
Dunn then identified several factors for determining whether a
particular area fell within the curtilage of a home.49 One factor considered "the nature of the uses to which the area is
put."5" When applying this criterion to the facts in Dunn, the
Court explained that it was "especially significant that the law
enforcement officials possessed objective data indicating that
the [area] was not being used for intimate activities of the
sions establish ...
that the Fourth Amendment does not preclude the government from obtaining the assistance of technology to observe an area that is exposed to the public, provided that the technology does not permit the government
to detect private activities occurring in the private areas.") (emphasis added).
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181 n.12.
Id. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
"
480 U.S. 294 (1987).
4" Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
"' Id. at 301.

so Id. The Court also looked to -the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an inclosure surrounding
the home . . . and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by." Id.
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home."5'
Oliver and Dunn were not the only cases lending support
to the government's claim in Kyllo that police conduct directed
at a home did not trigger constitutional scrutiny unless it revealed intimate details of the home. The Court held in California v. Ciraolo5 2 that no search occurred when police officers,
flying in navigable airspace, observed marijuana growing in a
fenced-in backyard.' The fact that the activities that the police observed lay within the curtilage did not help Ciraolo. 54
The Court ruled that the flyover was not a search because the
surveillance occurred in "a physically nonintrusive manner"
and within "public navigable airspace."55 Although Ciraolo
ruled that police flyovers do not trigger Fourth Amendment review, the Court left open the possibility that other types of
aerial observations might produce a different result.5 6 In particular, the Court highlighted the State's concession that
"'[alerial observation of curtilage may become invasive, either
due to physical intrusiveness or through modern technology
which discloses to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow
citizens." 5 7
Three years after deciding Ciraolo, in Florida v. Riley"
the Court ruled that helicopter surveillance of a greenhouse
adjacent to a home was not a search.5 9 Noting that Ciraolo
controlled this case, Justice White's plurality opinion explained

51 Id. at 302.
62 476 U.S. 207 (1986).

Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
In Oliver and Dunn, the police intrusions did not breach the curtilage.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
6 Id. at 215.
6' Id. at 215, n. 3, quoting Brief for Petitioner 14-15 (emphasis added). In
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), the Court held that aerial
photography of an industrial complex did not constitute a search. Dow Chem. Co.,
476 U.S. at 234. While acknowledging that the use of "highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant," the Court stressed
that the challenged photos did not reveal "intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns.' Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
"

58 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
59 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
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that "because the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left
partially open" and because the observation occurred while the
helicopter was in navigable airspace, Riley could not reasonably
have expected that the interior of the greenhouse would remain
free from police inspection.'o At the end of his opinion, however, Justice White acknowledged that the helicopter observation did not interfere with the normal use of the greenhouse
or other parts of the curtilage and, most importantly, "no intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage
were observed." 1
Relying on these cases and others not involving intrusions
of homes, the government argued in Kyllo that thermal imaging was not a search because it did not "'detect private activities occurring in private areas."' 2 This argument, however,
did not persuade Justice Scalia. According to Scalia, "[tihe
Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has never been
tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information
obtained."6 Justice Scalia then stated: "In the home, our cases
show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is
held safe from prying government eyes.' 4 Thus, the information that the thermal imaging device revealed, "how warm-or
even how relatively warm-Kyllo was heating his residence,"
was protected against government snooping.'
Therefore, with little fanfare, Kyllo turned aside a momentum that had been building in the Court's prior cases." Those
60

Id.

61 Id.

at 448-50.
at 452.

' Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (quoting Brief for United
States at 22); see also Andrew Riggs Dunlap, Fixing the Fourth Amendment with
Trade Secret Law: A Response to Kyllo v. United States, 90 GEO. L.J. 2175, 218485 (2002) (noting cases where the Court suggested that unless government conduct revealed "intimate details" of the home, no search occurred).
6

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
Id.

Id. at 38 (footnote omitted). Justice Scalia dismissed the government's reliance on Ciraolo's dictum cautioning against police use of modern technology that
exposes "intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to
police or fellow citizens." Id. at n.5 (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3). In
Justice Scalia's view, Ciraolo's "focus in this second-hand dictum was not upon
intimacy but upon otherwise-imperceptibility, which is precisely the principle we
vindicate today." Id. at n. 5.
6
Justice Scalia asserted that "our cases show, all details [of a home] are
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cases suggested that unless the challenged police conduct compromised intimate activities of the home, Fourth Amendment
review was unavailable.6 7 Justice Scalia's opinion signals a
readjustment in the Court's thinking on this issue." Just as
Katz discarded a narrow view of the Fourth Amendment's
scope,69 Kyllo also rejected the notion that a police intrusion
"must be rather substantial and must reveal specifically certain
intimate details" to invoke Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 70 For
this reason, Professor LaFave applauds Justice Scalia's opinion

intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government
eyes." Id. at 37. But United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) and Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), which are cited by Justice Scalia to support his
statement, are rather thin columns to support the rule that "all details" of a
home are constitutionally protected. Karo held that monitoring of a beeper constitutes a search when it reveals information regarding the inside of a home that
could not have been obtained through visual surveillance. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
Although Karo's holding is consistent with Justice Scalia's statement, before Kyllo,
the result in Karo had never been understood to stand for the proposition that
"all details' of a home are constitutionally protected. Rather, the result in Karo
turned on the fact that the beeper device used there helped the government "obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the
curtilage of the house.' Id. at 715. Similarly, Hicks was about limiting the scope
of police entries into homes," rather than establishing a rule that "all details" of
a home are constitutionally protected. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323. The Hicks majority,
in an opinion by Justice Scalia, first rejected the government's claim that an
officer's moving of stereo equipment to reveal its serial number did not constitute
a new "search' because it produced no additional invasion of privacy separate
from the already lawful presence of the officer, which was justified by an emergency call that a shooting had occurred inside the premises. Id. at 325 Justice
Scalia explained that "taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized
intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.' Id. at 325. He then noted: "A search
is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.'
Id. Interestingly, the holdings in Karo and Hicks did not prevent the Court from
finding that the aerial intrusions in Ciraolo and Riley were not searches despite
the fact that the challenged photography revealed details of the curtilage of private homes.
67 See supra notes 51-53, 65-66 and accompanying text.

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (noting that while
Olmstead held that "surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of
any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view').
89

'0 1 WAYNE

(Supp. 2002).

R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE

§

2.2, at 77 (3d ed. 1996)

2002]

KATZ, KYLLO, AND TECHNOLOGY

"for foregoing [one ofi the various privacy-belittling techniques
that have become rather common in efforts to narrow the
protections of the Katz doctrine."71
A second feature of Kyllo's reasoning-the importance of
bright-line rules-also indicates a change of direction, albeit a
shift that may be temporary, from the Court's most recent case
involving the scope of protection afforded private homes. In
Kyllo, Justice Scalia stated that restricting "the prohibition of
thermal imaging to 'intimate details' would not only be wrong
in principle; it would be impractical in application, failing to
provide 'a workable accommodation between the needs of law
enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. 72 He then noted the inability of police officers to predict the amount of detail that a particular thermal imaging
device will reveal.73 Justice Scalia also wondered whether the
Court was capable of articulating a Fourth Amendment rule
that identifies which activities of the home are "'intimate' and
which are not."74 And even if the Court announced such a
rule, "no police officer would be able to know in advance whether his through-the-wall surveillance picks up 'intimate' details-and thus would be unable to know in advance whether it
is constitutional."7 5 Accordingly, Justice Scalia concluded that
because the Fourth Amendment "draws 'a firm line at the entrance to the house,"76 police officers are better served if the
line is not "only firm but also bright'-which means "clear
specification of those methods of surveillance that require a
warrant."77
Kyllo's emphasis on the importance of bright-line rules is a
notable change of direction from the reasoning of the Court in

at 76.
I
ld.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181
(1984)).
" See id. at 38 (noting "there is no necessary connection between the sophistication of the surveillance equipment and the 'intimacy' of the details that it observes-which means that one cannot say (and the police cannot be assured) that
use of the relatively crude equipment at issue here will always be lawful").
14 Id. at 39.
75 Id.
71 Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
7 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
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78 In Carter, a police officer, peering
Minnesota v. Carter.
through a gap in the closed blinds of an apartment window,
observed three individuals bagging cocaine-the female lease79
holder of the premises and two men, Carter and Johns. Police eventually arrested the men outside of the apartment and
later learned that the men had entered the apartment for the
sole purpose of packaging cocaine, had no prior contact with
the premises, and that the men were in the apartment for approximately two-and-one-half hours.8 s The issue confronting
the Court was whether Carter and Johns had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in their host's home.8 '
Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion neatly summarized the extant doctrine. "[An overnight guest in a home may
claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is
merely present with the consent of the householder may
not."82 The facts in Carter were "obviously somewhere in between" the per se rules that the Court's prior cases established.
The Chief Justice concluded that the men could not invoke the
Fourth Amendment's protection because of "the purely commercial nature" of their behavior, their "relatively short period of
of any previous
time [spent] on the premises, and the lack
83
connection" between the men and their host.
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion providing the fifth vote in Carter." Interestingly, Justice Kennedy noted that the "[slecurity of the home must be guarded by
the law in a world where privacy is diminished by enhanced
surveillance and sophisticated communication systems." 5 He
also expressed his agreement with the dissenting Justices' view
that reasonable expectations of the host "are shared, to some
extent, by the guest." 6 For Justice Kennedy, this suggested a
7' 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
Carter, 525 U.S. at 85.
Id. at 86
l Id. at 87.
Id. at 90.
"
Id. at 91.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Despite this professed concern about
privacy being "diminished by enhanced surveillance and sophisticated communications systems," Justice Kennedy dissented in Kyllo. Id.
Id. at 102. At the start of his opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that he
'9
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general rule: "social guests will have an expectation of privacy
in their host's home."87 That said, however, Justice Kennedy
concluded that Carter and Johns could not rely on the Fourth
Amendment's protection because they had "nothing more than
a fleeting and insubstantial connection" with their host's
home." Justice Kennedy saw no reason "to fashion a per se
rule of home protection, with an automatic right for all in the
home to invoke the exclusionary rule, in order to protect homeowners and their guests from unlawful police intrusion."8 9
Although Kyllo and Carter both addressed the degree of
protection the Fourth Amendment provides for individuals
located in a home, Kyllo's stress on the importance of brightline rules to protect the privacy of the home and to provide
guidance for police contrasts sharply with the balancing analy9 Doubtlessly unintended, Justice Scalia's predisis of Carter.
lection for bright-line rules that protect the home is reminiscent of the per se rules that the Warren and Burger Courts
established. In cases like Karo v. United States,9 Steagald v.
United States,9 2 Payton v. New York,93 Mincey v. Arizona,"
9 5 Stoner v. California," and Chapman v.
Vale v. Louisiana,
United States,' bright-line rules were announced to protect
the privacy and security of the home. 8 Countervailing law
enforcement interests can usually be found to justify a police
intrusion of a home, especially when evidence of criminal con-

joined the Chief Justice's opinion because "its reasoning is consistent with my
view that almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and
hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their host's home." Id. at 99.
87 Id. at 102.
" Id. at 102.

'9 Id. at 103.
'o See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
9' 468 U.S. 705 (1984).

451 U.S. 204 (1981).
9

445 U.S. 573 (1980).
437 U.S. 385 (1978).
399 U.S. 30 (1970).

376 U.S. 483 (1964).
" 365 U.S. 610 (1961).

Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 93 (1989), which held that an overnight
guest is entitled to rely on the privacy of his host's home, is an example of a
bright-line rule protecting homes announced by the Rehnquist Court.
9
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duct is discovered.9 In the past, the Court developed per se
rules to pre-empt the ad hoc arguments frequently used to
compromise Fourth Amendment interests. 0 0
Bright-line rules are also meant to provide guidance to the
police; balancing models seldom afford such guidance. The
reasoning of the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy in Carter
illustrate the dangers of balancing. How is an officer to know
in advance whether his "Peeping-Tom" observations are directed at a guest or visitor who is entitled to share his host's privacy? Whether a person is entitled to constitutional protection
against arbitrary police snooping should not depend on information that is later discovered by the police. Nor should the
constitutionality of an officer's snooping turn on the length of a
person's visit or whether he stays overnight. "Otherwise, a
homeowner's sexual partner would have no expectation of privacy in the home and no standing to object if the police peered
through the closed blinds of a bedroom window, unless that
sexual partner spent the night."' ° ' More importantly, the ad

" In his dissent in Kyllo, Justice Stevens noted the "strong public interest"
served by a thermal imager. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[Plublic officials should not have to avert their senses or their equipment from
detecting emissions in the public domain such as excessive heat, traces of smoke,
suspicious odors, odorless gases, airborne particulates, or radioactive emissions,
any of which could identify hazards to the community.").
" See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (noting that the importance of the state's interest in prompt investigation of a murder, but explaining that a similar interest is extant for other serious crimes; "[i]f the warrantless
search of a homicide scene is reasonable, why not the warrantless search of the
scene of a rape, a robbery, or a burglary? 'No consideration relevant to the
Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation' of such a doctrine.')
(quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969)).
101 Tracey Macin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398, 434-35 (2001) (footnote omitted). Professor LaFave takes a different view of the impact of Carter. According to
LaFave:
Carter should not be taken to mean, with regard to a social guest, that if
something less than an overnight stay will suffice, the stay must be longer than the [two-and-a-half] hour visit in that case. This is because the
Court acknowledged that the situation there fell somewhere between that
of the Olson overnight guest (who had standing) and one who 'merely' is
lawfully present (without standing by virtue of the repudiation of [Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)]), and then held it to be closer to
the latter only after factoring in the lesser expectation of privacy that
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hoc balancing analysis in Carter undermines the security of
private homes. The result in Carter,as Professor Susan Bandes
notes "encourages ... searches of homes that invade the privacy of homeowners, so long as it is the visitor, not the homeowner, who is caught with contraband."'0 2 In sum, Justice Scalia's
decision in Kyllo to adopt a bright-line rule protecting "all details" of the home, no matter how insignificant the information,
calls to mind an earlier judicial attitude about Fourth Amendment rules that affect the home and is a notable change of
direction from the Court's most recent ruling involving the protection afforded private homes.
C. Both cases rest on simple, but persuasive logic
A final characteristic that Katz and Kyllo share is that
both cases based their conclusions on a simple, but persuasive,
logic. In Katz, Justice Stewart explained that a person who
enters a telephone booth, "shuts the door behind him, and pays
the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not
be broadcast to the world." 0 3 A contrary view would "ignore
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in
private communication."" In Kyllo, the crucial factor was
that the thermal imaging device enabled the government to
discover information about the inside of a home that was otherwise unavailable without a physical intrusion.' For Justice
Scalia, the legal question in Kyllo was straightforward: Should
the government be free to gather any detail concerning the
attends 'property used for commercial purposes.' There is no reason why a
much shorter-term social visitor should be deemed to lack standing.
Id. at 5 LAFAVE, supra note 70, § 11.3 at 23.
Bandes, supra note 25 at 1381 (footnote omitted).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); see also id. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring) (same).
...Id. Professor Lewis Katz nicely summarizes why Katz has been viewed as a
"seminal" case. "A seminal case should provide a framework for its later application. However, the seminal quality of Katz lies in its understanding of what the
[F]ourth [A]mendment is about rather than in the clarity of its rule." Lewis R.
Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 IND. L.
J. 549, 562 (1990).
"06See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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inside of someone's home without complying with the requirements of the Warrant Clause? In answering this inquiry, Justice Scalia saw a direct link between thermal imaging and the
intrusions that writs of assistances and general warrants authorized, which prompted the Framers to adopt the Fourth
Amendment.1 6 When viewed from this perspective, the answer was clearly "no." A contrary view would compromise "that
degree of privacy against government
that existed when the
10 7
Fourth Amendment was adopted."

II.

THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF KATZ

The above discussion establishes that Katz and Kyllo share
certain common traits. Whether Kyllo's long-term impact will
be similar to the influence of Katz is currently unknown. Although Kyllo's influence has yet to be determined, one can still
make predictions about its effect on future Fourth Amendment
doctrine. However, before considering Kyllo's potency for the
future, it may be instructive to recall the influence of Katz. The
following section demonstrates that Katz's impact on protecting
Fourth Amendment liberties, particularly when technological
innovations threaten those liberties, has been insignificant
because Katz itself lacked substance. A lack of substance, however, was not the only factor contributing to Katz's failure to
protect Fourth Amendment liberties. The Justices who decided
Katz could not agree on Katz's meaning. This lack of consensus
about a "landmark" case would make it easier for future Justices to dismiss the relevance of Katz in subsequent disputes
concerning the Amendment's reach. To the extent that Kyllo
contains similar defects, its capability and strength to protect
Fourth Amendment interests against technological advances
may prove to be doubtful.

'06 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (noting that although the compromise of Kyllo's privacy was insignificant, that fact is unimportant: "we must take the long view,
from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward").
Id. at 34.
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A. Katz's Lack of Substance
As described earlier, the reasoning and holding in Katz
rested on three factors. First, the Court dismissed the importance of determining whether a telephone booth is a "constitutionally protected area.""~ Second, the Court rejected the
"trespass" rule of prior cases."° Third, the Court emphasized
the practical and vital role that public telephones play in private communications." 0 Taken together, these factors moved
the Court to find that "a person in a telephone booth may rely
upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment.""' The factors
cited in Katz lead to the sensible result that telephone conversations are entitled to constitutional protection."' But when
these factors are removed from the facts in Katz, their usefulness for deciding the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection in other contexts becomes illusory.
Consider, for example, Katz's rejection of the litigants'
efforts to determine whether a telephone booth was a "constitutionally protected area."" 3 Justice Stewart asserted that focusing on whether a telephone booth is a constitutionally protected place "deflects attention from the problem presented by
the case.""" He then wrote his famous epigram: "[Tihe Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 5 This statement,
while literally true, begs the question."' More importantly,

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
at 352-53.
"o Id. at 359.
108

19 Id.

.. Id. at 352.
"2

1
114

Id. at 357.
Id. at 351.
Id.

115 Id.
116 See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 23 at 385 (noting that the formula in

Katz "begs the question. But I think it begs the question no more or less than
any other theory of fourth amendment coverage the Court has used."). See also 1
LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.1(b) at 385. Professor LaFave remarks:
[Ilt can hardly be said that the [Katz] Court produced clarity where
theretofore there had been uncertainty. If anything, the exact opposite has
occurred. The pre-Katz rule, though perhaps 'unjust,' was 'a workable tool
for the reasoning of the courts.' But the Katz rule, which the Court has
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asserting that the Amendment protects "people, not places,"
provides no guidance for determining, in future cases, when the
Amendment protects people." 7 The emptiness of Justice
Stewart's quip undoubtedly prompted Justice Harlan's clarification regarding the Amendment's scope. Justice Harlan noted
that simply asserting "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places" tells us nothing because the crucial question "is
what protection it affords to those people.""' According to
Justice Harlan, "the answer to that question [generally] requires reference to a 'place. ""' 9 However, if one accepts Justice Harlan's reinterpretation of Katz, then, as Professor
Sklansky observes, "the most famous words in Katz seem
drained of most of their content.""2
As Justice Harlan and others have recognized, Katz's replacement for the concept of a "constitutionally protected ar-

since-somewhat inaccurately-stated as the 'reasonable "expectation of
privacy' test, is by comparison 'difficult to apply.' In short, the Katz
'opinion offers little to fill the void it has thus created.'
1 LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 385 (footnotes omitted).
117 See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 1, at 339 (arguing that the Katz analysis
has
"no textual support in the language of the amendment" and thus "leaves the fluid
concept of privacy to the vagaries of shifting Court majorities, which are able to
manipulate the concept to either expand or contract the meaning of the word at
will") (footnote omitted); Katz, supra note 104, at 559-60 ("[Justice Stewart's opinion] freed the [Flourth [A]mendment from the chains imposed by the property
limitation and the requirement of a physical trespass but provided modest guidance for determining the justiciability of an expectation of privacy in other contexts."). Cf Ku, supra note 1, at 1346 (arguing that "by failing to provide any
real guidance to the privacy value, [Katz] did not shut the door to examining [the
means used by government agents], and subsequent decisions have taken advantage of this opening, artfully transforming the reasonable expectation of privacy
test into a means-oriented analysis") (footnote omitted).
11 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. See also David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth
I'
Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 18 (1996)
(explaining that after Katz "Fourth Amendment protection depends not only on
how an individual protects his privacy, but where and in what situation he does
so").
" Sklansky, supra note 24 at 158; cf Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo. A
Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HAsTINGs L.J. 1303, 1312 (noting that Justice Harlan's reformation of the
rule of Katz "sits somewhat awkwardly alongside the majority opinion and makes
it more difficult to give meaning to the vague 'reasonable expectations of privacy'
test).
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ea--asserting that the "Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places"-was a constitutional norm without substance. Because it is essentially meaningless, the norm that symbolizes
the spirit and meaning of Katz, ironically, has proved to be
quite ineffective, as a practical matter, in protecting people.
Katz's malleability and emptiness made it especially vulnerable
in cases involving technological change. For example, within
three years of the Katz decision, the Court confronted an issue
that had divided the Justices in 1952. In United States v.
White,12 ' the Court had to decide whether the testimony of
federal officers concerning conversations between the defendant
and a government informant, which the officers monitoring the
frequency of a radio transmitter that the informant carried
overheard, implicated the Fourth Amendment.' 22 Like On Lee,
White ruled that the officers' electronic surveillance was not a
search. Speaking for a plurality of the Court, Justice White
explained the result with a syllogism: If a person assumes the
risk that a secret government spy, acting without electronic
equipment, might later reveal the contents of a conversation,
the risk is the same when the spy simultaneously records and
transmits the conversation to a government officer." In both
situations, "the risk is his," and the Fourth Amendment provides no protection against government conduct to obtain information in this manner."
For the White plurality, Katz was irrelevant." "Although
Katz announced that the Court would no longer be controlled
by rigid and antiquated concepts when formulating the scope of
the Fourth Amendment, the White plurality read Katz as hav401 U.S. 745 (1971).
White, 401 U.S. at 746-47.
12 See id. at 751-52 (plurality opinion).
12

124 Id. at 752-53.
12 Justice White distinguished Katz this way:

Katz involved no revelation to the Government by a party to conversations with the defendant nor did the Court indicate in any way that a
defendant has a justifiable and constitutionally protected expectation that
a person with whom he is conversing will not then or later reveal the
conversation to the police.
Id. at 749. Put simply, the Fourth Amendment does not cover eavesdropping by
the government with the connivance of one of the parties.
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ing no impact on the secret spy cases"" decided before Katz.
The White plurality, without any discussion or analysis of the
doctrinal shift announced in Katz, reaffirmed prior holdings
that authorized unchecked surveillance of private conversations
and unbridled invasions of private homes and offices whenever
informants are available to gather information for the government. If the "Fourth Amendment protects people, and not places," as Katz insisted, then why is the Amendment inapplicable
against government efforts to record conversations or infiltrate
homes or offices using secret informants?
If the Fourth Amendment restrains the discretion of the police to wiretap or 'bug' private conversations [conducted in
telephone booths], it is not apparent why that same provision
is inapplicable when the police monitor and record private
conversations through the use of a secret informant deliberately position[ed] to hear those conversations. After all, a
secret informant acts as a 'human bug' for the government."2
The result in White proved that Katz offered no protection
against this type of unchecked government electronic surveillance.
Katz's announcement that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," also did not protect people from the
unbridled use of electronic surveillance employed in Smith v.
Maryland." The question Smith presented was whether the
installation and use of a pen register was a search under the
Amendment."2 The Court ruled that the pen register was not
a search. Smith distinguished a pen register from wiretapping
on several grounds. ° The crux of the Court's logic, however,
Tracey Maclin, Informants and the Fourth Amendment, 74 WASH. U. L.
573, 620-21 (1996) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Maclin, Informants].
12

Q.

Maclin, Informants, supra note 126, at 625.

442 U.S. 735 (1979).
The Court explained that a pen register 'is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses
caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually completed. Smith,
442 U.S. at 736, n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161,
n.1 (1977)).
" Smith distinguished wiretapping from a pen register in the following ways.
'

"
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can be quickly summarized: The Fourth Amendment is not
implicated because a person has no legitimate privacy interest
in the telephone numbers he dials. The person assumes the
risk that the telephone company will convey the numbers he
dials to the government.
The Court was indifferent to the fact that technological
innovations granted the government greater and more proficient access to information about a person's private communications."' In the Court's view, contemporary telephone equipment, including pen registers, is "merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber."'32 Noting that a person would
have no legitimate privacy interest in the numbers he dialed if
an operator processed those calls, the Court was "not inclined
to hold that a different constitutional result is required because
the telephone company has decided to automate.""
Smith did proclaim, unlike the White plurality, that Katz
was its "lodestar" for determining whether government-initiated electronic surveillance triggered Fourth Amendment scrutiny.1" But the protective shield of Katz was just as ineffective
in Smith as it was in White. When Katz stated "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places," criticism of this norm
was muted because the majority of the Justices (like the majority of the nation) thought that private telephone conversations
should be constitutionally protected. The emptiness of this
norm, however, created a vacuum that the Court would have to
First, unlike a listening device, a pen register "do[es] not acquire the contents of
communications." Id. at 741. Literally speaking, pen registers are not "recording
devices" because they do not -hear sound."' Id. (quoting United States v. N.Y.
Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)). Furthermore, unlike listening devices, pen
registers do not record "any communication between the caller and the recipient

of the call, [disclose the] identities [of the callers], [or tell] whether the call was
even completed.' Id.

131 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart notes that: "[tihe
numbers dialed
from a private telephone-although certainly more prosaic than the conversation
itself are not without 'content." Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Pen registers
reveal, "the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the
most intimate details of a person's life." Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 744.
133

Id. at 745.

1" Id.

at 739.
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fill in later cases where there was greater controversy about
the challenged police practice. As those cases emerged, the
Court needed legal theories to support controversial results
that divided the Justices. The post-Katz Court used the expectations theory13 5 and risk analysis to define the scope of the
Fourth Amendment. The same assumption of risk theory supporting White's holding supported Smith's holding. As Justice
Stewart belatedly recognized, however, "[iut is simply not
enough to say, after Katz, that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed because the caller assumes the risk that the telephone company will disclose them
to the police."'
Regrettably, Justice Stewart's realization

'1
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(explaining his view of the rule that has emerged through prior decisions is that
"there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'"). In White, Justice Harlan appeared
to recant his endorsement of expectations theory as a tool for measuring the
Fourth Amendment's scope. See, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that legal analysis in this context must "transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of
risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of
laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.");
see also, Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 384 ("Justice Harlan himself later expressed second thoughts about [expectations theory], and rightly so. An actual,
subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of what
Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can neither
add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment protection.").
136 Smith, 442 U.S. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart argued
that Smith's risk analysis was inconsistent with Katz. He also contended that risk
analysis was a flawed legal theory because it proved too much. Telephone conversations:
must be electronically transmitted by telephone company equipment, and
may be recorded or overheard by the use of other company equipment.
Yet we have squarely held that the user of even a public telephone is
entitled 'to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not
be broadcast to the world.'
Id. at 746-47 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 352). Why shouldn't a caller assume the risk that his conversation may be turned over to the government, just as the numbers he dials may be conveyed to the government? People
do not assume that risk, or assume the risk that our mail may be opened and
read by government officers, because the Court has said we do not have to assume
those risks. Risk analysis is not based on a neutral principle. We assume only
those risks the Court says we must assume. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 18 at
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came too late." 7 By 1979, Katz's famous words were a meaningless slogan, often cited but lacking principle and influence.
Expectations theory and risk analysis replaced Katz as the
defining methodology for measuring the Fourth Amendment's
protection."
The second factor supporting Katz's reasoning and holding
adopted the view that "the reach of [the Fourth Amendment]
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 39 Rejection of the "trespass"
rule heralded a new model of search and seizure
jurisprudence."4 Common-law property rules would no longer

380 (citation omitted) (noting that we do not assume the risk that our telephone
calls or mail is being monitored because the Court has ruled that the government
may not conduct such surveillance).
1.7 Interestingly, Justice Stewart had joined the plurality opinion in White
which, as noted in the text, relied on the assumption of risk theory to support
the holding. See generally White, 401 U.S. at 745-54 (plurality opinion).
1"
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Miller ruled that a government subpoena of bank checks and deposit slips from banks did not constitute
a search. The Court explained that the "depositor takes the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government." Id. at 443. The "assumption of risk" rule applies "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in third party will not be betrayed." Id. For a
detailed discussion of the Court's analysis in Smith, see Clifford S. Fishman, Pen
Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of Congressional
Intent, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 557, 561 (1980) (noting that "[a]lthough the result in
Smith is supportable under the particular facts of the case, the Court's reasoning
poses significant problems of both statutory and constitutional dimensions"); id. at
569 (asserting that Smith's "reliance on Miller to support an assumption of risk
rationale in the context of electronic surveillance is rather tenuous"). Professor
Daniel Solove describes the constitutional framework established by risk analysis
as the "new Olmstead."
Although we have moved from the Boyd [v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886)] and Olmstead world of physical papers and places to a new regime based upon expectations or privacy, there is a new Olmstead, one
that is just as shortsighted and rigid in approach. The Court's new conception of privacy is one of total secrecy. If any information is exposed to
the public or if law enforcement officials can view something from any
public vantage point, then the Court has refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1133 (2002).
"'
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
"4
See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.2 (c) at 418 (describing Katz's disap-
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dominate the debate about the scope and meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Without being tethered to archaic rules,
the Court was free to conduct a modern and realistic assessment about which police practices should be subject to constitutional scrutiny. But loosening the connection between search
and seizure law and common-law rules did not enhance Katz's
authority to protect Fourth Amendment interests in future
cases. Indeed, besides the outcome in Katz itself, rejection of
the trespass rule rarely made a difference in search and seizure

rulings.
Rejection of the "trespass" rule ignited no real controversy
among the Justices in Katz.' One explanation for this consensus may be that the trespass rule specifically, and commonlaw property rules generally, no longer exerted influence on
search and seizure doctrine. Since at least the 1950's, the persuasive quality of these rules waned. "The validity of the trespass rationale was questionable even at the time [On Lee] was
rendered" in 1952.142 Rulings subsequent to On Lee further
eroded the property-based foundations of Fourth Amendment
law." As Justice Harlan explained, search and seizure doc-

proval of the trespass rule as a "dramatic shift [which] made it quite clear that
the earlier [lower court] decisions upholding the use of telescopic devices by reliance upon Goldman [v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) and Hester [u. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)] could no longer be safely relied upon").
"4 Even Justice Black, the sole dissenter in Katz, did not object when the
Court jettisoned the trespass rule. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 368-69 (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining that the presence or absence of a trespass was not determinative in the pre-Katz cases).
142 White, 401 U.S. at 774 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also, Katz, supra note
104 at 558 (noting that by 1960, dissatisfaction with the trespass doctrine was
being expressed within the Court and by legal academics).
" See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Seven months prior to
Katz, Hayden stated:
The premise that property interests control the right of the Government
to search and seize has been discredited. Searches and seizures may be
'unreasonable' within the Fourth Amendment even though the Government asserts a superior property interest at common law. We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection
of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional
and procedural barriers rested on property concepts.
Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960)
and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
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trine immediately prior to Katz demonstrated "no tolerance for
the old dividing lines resting, as they did, on fiction and common-law distinctions without sound policy justification in the
realm of values protected by the Fourth Amendment."' Under this view, the Katz opinion, rather than initiating a fundamental shift, was merely a final and formal acknowledgement
that the trespass rule had outlived its usefulness.'4 5
Moreover, the trespass or physical penetration concept was
quickly becoming obsolete. Technological change was allowing
government officials to obtain information without physical
intrusions into constitutionally protected areas. Dog sniffs,
airplanes and electronic beepers were a small sample of the
types of technological advances that enabled the government to
obtain information without physical intrusion. When litigants
raised constitutional challenges against these investigative
devices, the Court responded as if it had not decided Katz. For
example, in United States v. Place,4 ' the Court concluded
that exposing personal luggage to a narcotics detection dog was
not a "search."47 Place concluded "the canine sniff is sui generis."45 It does not "require opening the luggage" and "discloses only49 the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband
"1
item.
14 White, 401 U.S. at 778 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
145 Cf, id. at 780 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Viewed in perspective, then, Katz

added no new dimension to the law. At most it was a formal dispatch of
Olmstead and the notion that such problems may usefully be resolved in the light
of trespass doctrine, and, of course, it freed from speculation what was already
evident, that On Lee was completely open to question.").
148 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
147 Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
1
Id. Not surprisingly, "canine sniffs turned out not to be sui generis at all."
Harris, supra note 119, at 30, n.177. The next year, in United States v. Jacobsen,

466 U.S. 109 (1984), the Court employed the logic of Place to find that a chemical field test of powdery substance did not constitute a search. Because the chem-

ical test-like the canine sniff-only revealed whether the powder was cocaine or
not, no Fourth Amendment interests were triggered. Jacobsen 466 U.S. at 123-24.
"The [Jacobsen] Court also extended the reach of Place, by saying that the search
not only disclosed a limited amount of information, but also that it disclosed only
a type of information-the presence of absence of cocaine-in which there could be
no legitimate expectation of privacy." Harris, supra note 119, at 31.
149 Place, 462 U.S. at 707. Place explained that because there was no physical
intrusion, the dog sniff "does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise
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The analytical tension between Place and Katz is manifest.
Why does it matter that the dog sniff does not require opening
of luggage? After all, Place recognized that "a person possesses
a privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage that is
protected by the Fourth Amendment,""5 and conceded that
"the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of
the luggage, [although] the information ... is limited."1 5 ' The
absence of a physical intrusion does not diminish a person's
privacy interest in his luggage, just as the absence of a physical
intrusion into a telephone booth did not diminish Katz's interest in the privacy of his telephone conversations. More importantly, Katz instructed that Fourth Amendment protection does
not turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion.
Thus, the "manner" of the police intrusion in Place should be
irrelevant.
Likewise, California v. Ciraolo52 held that naked-eye aerial observation of an individual's backyard did not constitute a
search.'53 Writing for a five Justice majority, Chief Justice
Burger asserted no search occurred because the police observations "took place within public navigable airspace" in a "physically nonintrusive manner.""5' Again, Katz's impotence was
evident. The dissent charged that the Chief Justice had ignored
fundamental elements of Katz's reasoning.155 Rather than ad-

would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information
is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a

typical search." Id.
'50 Id. at 707 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)).

...Id. As Professor Harris has noted, the canine sniff does not simply augment human capabilities.
Although bath man and dog can smell, the dog's nose was not simply a
way to enhance what the human at the end of the leash could do. Rather, the canine nose is so much better-more sensitive and more accurate-than its human counterpart that it simply could not be said to re-

place it.
Harris, supra note 119 at 24, n.137.
152 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
15 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
15 Id. at 213.
Justice Powell's dissent in Ciraolo complained that the majority was ignoring Justice Harlan's warning that any "decision to construe the Fourth Amend-
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dress the obvious tension between his reasoning and Katz, the
Chief Justice essentially confined the reach of Katz to a privilege against warrantless wiretapping.'56 According to the
Chief Justice, the concerns of the Katz majority and Justice
Harlan focused on electronic interception of telephone communications. "One can reasonably doubt that in 1967 [the Justices
of Katz] considered an aircraft within the category of future
'electronic' developments that could stealthily intrude upon an
individual's privacy."' 57 Once the Chief Justice disabled Katz
in this way, it was easy to conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not bar naked eye aerial observation of a person's
backyard.
Finally, the result and reasoning of United States v.
5
Knotts"'
reveals the insignificance of Katz's proclamation
that the Fourth Amendment's reach "cannot turn upon the
presence of absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."'59 Knotts was the Court's first "beeper" case."6 Law
ment as proscribing only physical intrusions by police onto private property 'is, in
the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of
privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.'" Id. at 215-16
(Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Justice Powell also noted that the Ciraolo majority's reliance on the fact that the
flyover was conducted in a physically nonintrusive manner directly contradicted
Katz.
Reliance on the manner of surveillance is directly contrary to the standard of Katz, which identifies a constitutionally protected privacy right by
focusing on the interests of the individual and of a free society. Since
Katz, we have consistently held that the presence or absence of physical
trespass by police is constitutionally irrelevant to the question whether
society is prepared to recognize an asserted privacy interest as reasonable.
Id. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
'" See id. at 214.
157

Id. at 215.

15

460 U.S. 276 (1983).

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
1 The Court described the "beeper" as "a radio transmitter, usually battery
operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver."
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. The Court's second beeper case was Karo v. United
States, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). For a comprehensive and informative analysis of
Knotts and Karo, see Clifford S. Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the
Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH.
U. L. REv. 277 (1985); Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means
"'
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enforcement officers installed a beeper in a drum of chloroform
that one of the defendants purchased in Minnesota. Visual and
electronic surveillance enabled officers to monitor the whereabouts of the drum as it traveled from Minnesota to Wisconsin.
The officers eventually discovered that the beeper signal was
stationary and situated near a secluded cabin. A subsequent
search of the cabin pursuant to a warrant, based in part on the
information the officers had obtained while monitoring the
beeper, disclosed a drug laboratory. The issue in Knotts was
whether the monitoring was a search. Relying upon the lesser
expectation of privacy associated with cars, Knotts first stated
that a "person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another."16 '
The Court then addressed whether the use of electronic
detection equipment triggered Fourth Amendment interests. As
in the other post-Katz cases that posed conflicts between technology and Fourth Amendment rights, the Knotts Court did not
see Katz's reasoning as placing any constitutional restraints on
police use of beepers. In fact, Knotts's logic proceeded as if the
Court had never heard of Katz. According to then-Justice
Rehnquist, the author of Knotts, "[niothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement
as science and technology afforded them in this case."'6 2 This
statement, however, contradicts Katz itself.'6 3
Under Justice Rehnquist's reasoning, the Fourth AmendModels of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 647, 699-707 (1988).
'6'
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
'i
ld. at 282.
16 See id. at 288 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Knotts, Justice Stevens stated
that the electronic augmentation "was unobjectionable, [but] it by no means follows that the use of electronic detection techniques does not implicate especially
sensitive concerns." Id. Professor Fishman, who generally supports the result in
Knotts, agrees with Justice Stevens' concern that sense-enhancement equipment
raise especially sensitive issues. Fishman, supra note 160, at 323. But Professor
Fishman also believes that the Knotts majority was aware of the potential dangers posed by technological enhancement, and thus wrote a narrow opinion that
authorized only the specific surveillance at issue in that case. Fishman, supra
note 160, at 323.
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ment provides no protection against electronic or technological
devices that enhance human senses, even when electronic surveillance is indispensable to the government's ability to gather
information. Because the officers in Knotts were unable to
maintain visual surveillance of the drum as it traveled from
Minnesota to Wisconsin, the beeper allowed them to locate the
chloroform "when they would not have been able to do so had
they relied solely on their naked eyes."" Justice Rehnquist,
however, concluded that "scientific enhancement of this sort
raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would
not also raise.""6 5 In other words, because an officer in a car
(or in a helicopter)" theoretically could have maintained visual observation of the drum as it traveled across the country
without triggering constitutional protection, no constitutional
concerns are raised if that officer utilizes electronic equipment
to accomplish the same task.
In a technologically advanced society, acceptance of Justice
Rehnquist's rationale in Knotts-equating electronic surveillance with what police might theoretically accomplish with
naked eye monitoring-means that the Fourth Amendment will
protect very little.16 7 In the theoretical world, one can always
imagine methods in which the police are able to watch, listen,

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. Cf Fishman, supra note 160, at 324, n.194 (acknowledging that the police did not learn of the defendant's destination by visual
surveillance).
16 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
At one point in their surveillance of the defendant's automobile, the defen"
dant took evasive action and the officers ended their visual surveillance. "At
about the same time officers lost the signal from the beeper, but with the assistance of a monitoring device located in a helicopter the approximate location of
the signal was picked up again about one hour later." Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
" Professor LaFave's reaction to Knotts has been more polite. "It is this assumed equivalence between mere 'visual surveillance' and 'scientific enhancement'
in Knotts which is troublesome." LAFAVE, supra note 21, §2.7(e) at 645. Professor
LaFave properly notes what Justice Rehnquist refused to admit: "The use of an
electronic tracking device permits a much more extended and thorough surveillance of an individual than would otherwise be possible." LAFAVE, supra note 21,
§2.7(e) at 645. Cf. Ku, supra note 1, at 1348 (noting that the practical impact of
Knotts allows "government to monitor any individual outside of the home twentyfour hours a day without any discussion of how that monitoring might affect the
individual or what that surveillance might do to the relationship between government and individual") (footnote omitted).
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or even smell, the activities of a suspect in order to detect useful information. In the real world, however, police investigative
methods are subject to financial, personnel and political restraints. The scope of the Fourth Amendment should not be
measured by a judge's ability (or inability) to conjure hypothetical scenarios in which an individual's activities are monitored
by police who are able to "augment[] the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
and technology" permits." Otherwise, very few human activities will be beyond the government's surveillance capabilities.
The leeway given the police under Knotts's reasoning is
illustrated by applying Knotts's rationale to a "hypothetical"
Katz case. Under Knotts's logic, the result in Katz is uncertain.169 Conceivably, lip-reading FBI agents could watch and
transcribe what they saw as Katz spoke in a glass enclosed
phone booth. If Katz became aware of the agents' presence and
covered his lips, presumably, under the analysis of Knotts, the
agents could turn on a wiretap to augment their sensory faculties without triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Just as
the officers in Knotts used electronic equipment-without triggering constitutional safeguards-to discover the location of the
chloroform "when they would not have been able to do so had
they relied solely on their naked eyes,"17 lip-reading FBI
agents could have also used electronic surveillance to ascertain
Katz's communications when they "would not have been able to
" ' In either
do so had they relied solely on their naked eyes."17
case, "[niothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police
[or FBI] from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon

168
16

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
Cf. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.7(e) at 646, n.114 ("[A] Smith-Knotts type

of analysis could well have produced the result that Katz lacked an expectation of
privacy because what he said could have been determined by a lip reader some
distance away or by a hypothetical bystander immediately adjacent to the

booth.").

'70 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
17
Id. See also JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCE-

DURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 88 (1999) (asking whether the
result in Katz would be the same if FBI agents "had positioned a lip reader immediately outside the telephone booth who observed Katz's lips and recorded his
words on paper").
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them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afford[s]." 72 As Justice Rehnquist suggested in Knotts,
"scientific enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional
issues which visual surveillance would not also raise."' 7 At
bottom, Knotts's reasoning raises doubts about the protection
that Katz provided. 74
As in Smith v. Maryland, Place and Ciraolo,the reasoning
of Knotts shows that Katz's rejection of the trespass rule has

Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
Id. at 285.
174 Professor Fishman does not
1
1

agree with

this criticism

of Knotts. See

Fishman, supra note 160, at 325. He notes:
Surveillance of one's location and surveillance of one's words differ, not
merely in degree, but in kind. Under most circumstances, a person's location and travel simply are not 'private,' and surveillance, though potentially offensive, does not intrude as deeply or as dangerously into privacy
and individual liberty as does surreptitious surveillance of what one says
to friends, relatives and other confidants. Thus, it is not at all inconsistent for the Court to have held that electronic surveillance of communications is a search subject to Fourth Amendment protection, while also
holding that electronic surveillance of public travel is not.
Fishman, supra note 160, at 325 (footnote omitted). While reasonable minds might
agree that the "location" surveillance in Knotts is not as intrusive as the communication surveillance in Katz, my criticism of Knotts is not focused on the degree or
intrusiveness of the surveillance involved in that case. Rather, my point is to highlight the contrasting analytical methods between Knotts and Katz. As noted in the
text, Knotts's analysis gives the police enormous latitude to monitor the activities
of individuals. In some cases, the surveillance will be quite intrusive, as in the
example of the lip-reading FBI agents who augment their sensory faculties with
electronic equipment. In other cases, the surveillance may be insignificant, as Justice Stevens believed to be the case in Kyllo. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 43 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "the ordinary use of the senses
might enable a neighbor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building"); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45 (arguing that police "should not have to avert their
senses or their [sense-enhancing] equipment from detecting emissions in the public
domain," particularly when "the countervailing privacy interest is at best trivial").
In a third group of cases, reasonable minds might disagree about the intrusiveness
involved when government officers are free to augment their sensory faculties with
enhancement by scientific and technological devices. Compare Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 741 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) with Smith, 422 U.S. at 746-48 (opinion of Stewart, J., dissenting). In sum, the problem with the Court's analysis in
Knotts is that it proves too much. Under Knotts's logic, the Fourth Amendment
will be inapplicable if the government can convince a judge that the information
revealed by the technological or scientific intrusion could have been detected by
officers combining sense-enhancing equipment with their ordinary human senses.

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 72

had little impact on subsequent search and seizure cases involving technological and scientific innovations. Before it was
finally overruled, the trespass rule had lost its influence among
the Justices. Even if Katz had not reversed the trespass rule,
law enforcement investigative methods, with the aid of technology, were advancing at such a rapid pace that the government
could obtain various types of information without a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. Thus, Katz's
proclamation on this point was meaningless, and the Court's
later decisions would show that Katz's reasoning would matter
little when police utilized other types of technological tools to
gather information.
The third and final factor that Katz emphasized was that
"[olne who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world."'7 5 Katz explained
that the warrantless wiretap violated "the privacy upon which
[Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment."'76
This aspect of Katz is nearly impossible to administer. As
Professor LaFave comments, the "expectation" formula of Katz
does not produce "clarity where theretofore there had been
uncertainty. If anything, the exact opposite has occurred." 77
The rest of the Katz opinion, as the above discussion demonstrates, provides scant guidance on explaining when other
individuals can "justifiably rel~y]" on the Fourth Amendment to
protect them from warrantless government surveillance. 78 In

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
at 353.
17 1 LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.1(b) at 385.
..
s See supra note 174 and accompanying text; see also, Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34
1

178 Id.

(noting that Katz's expectations test "has often been criticized as circular, and
hence subjective and unpredictable") (citations omitted); LAFAVE, supra note 21,
§ 2.1(b) at 386 (explaining that "Ia]lthough Katz unquestionably expands the coverage of the Fourth Amendment, even now-despite the intervening years since
Katz was handed down-it is impossible to state with precision the degree of this

expansion"); Gutterman, supra note 160, at 665 (noting that "[glovernment conduct could be insulated from [constitutional] review when the precautions taken
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sum, because it lacks any type of principled norm, the expectations test, like the other two factors that Katz emphasized, does
not provide a substantive model or neutral principle that protects Fourth Amendment liberties.
B. The Justices Themselves Could Not Agree On
The Meaning of Katz
Because the three factors critical to the result in Katz were
meaningless or insignificant, it is not surprising that Katz has
been ineffective in protecting Fourth Amendment interests in
cases not involving wiretapping or electronic bugging of private
conversations. But the emptiness of these factors was not the
only problem with Katz. Another flaw in Katz, although not
immediately apparent in the Court's opinion, was the fact that
the Justices who joined the result in Katz could not agree on its
meaning. The inability of the Justices who decided Katz to
agree on the scope and impact of their own decision diminished
any expectation that Katz could have a lasting impact on
Fourth Amendment liberties. Indeed, the discord over Katz,
when combined with the emptiness of its legal framework, only
increased the chances that future Justices would see Katz as a
narrow precedent regarding the Fourth Amendment's scope in
a scientific and technologically advanced society.
Although few would realize the point until much later, the
scope of Katz's holding was in doubt on the day the Court rendered its decision. In his concurring opinion, Justice White
asserted that Katz left undisturbed a line of cases dealing with
informants and wired spies.'79 According to Justice White,
when a person speaks to another, the speaker "takes all the
risks ordinarily inherent in so doing, including the risk that
the man to whom he speaks will make public what he has

were not weighted sufficiently to earn privacy. The Katz promise had sowed its
own seeds of destruction.") (footnote omitted); cf JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNwANTED
GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 63 (Random House 2000) ("[The
real problem with the Supreme Court's test for invasions of privacy is not empirical but conceptual. In many cases, people have an objectively valid expectation of
privacy that the Court, by judicial fiat, has deemed unjustifiable.").
' Katz, 389 U.S. at 363, n.* (White, J., concurring).
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heard."8 ° The Fourth Amendment affords no protection
against "unreliable (or law-abiding) associates." 8 ' A sensible
extension of this rule, according to Justice White, leads to the
conclusion that a speaker also assumes the risk "that his hearer, free to memorize what he hears for later verbatim repetitions, is instead recording it or transmitting it to another."'82
Katz, on the other hand, dealt with "an entirely different situation" because Katz attempted to exclude uninvited listeners
and "spoke under circumstances in which a reasonable person
would assume that uninvited ears were not listening."183
Justice White's comments sought to bolster the "assumption of risk" analysis that supported On Lee. When Katz was
decided, no member of the Katz majority challenged Justice
White's interpretation of Katz's holding. Four years later, however, an influential member of the Katz majority challenged
Justice White's understanding of Katz's impact on the wired
spy cases. Justice Harlan, the author of what later became
known as the "Katz analysis"' 4 or "Katz test,"85 disputed
Justice White's interpretation of Katz in United States v.
White. 88 On this occasion, however, Justice White's views on
Katz's meaning would prevail over the views of Justice Harlan.
White reaffirmed On Lee's holding that governmental use
of a wired spy to record the conversations of an individual is
not a search under the Fourth Amendment. As noted earlier,
Justice White's plurality opinion in White relied upon the assumption of risk theory to explain why an individual has no
constitutionally protected interests against government use of
wired informants. Not surprisingly, Justice White read Katz's
holding, as he did in his concurring opinion in Katz, as not

1" Id. (White, J., concurring).
181

Id.

18 Id.
i18 Id.
18 Smith

v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (referring to Justice Harlan's
concurrence in Katz which established a two-part test for determining when a
.search" occurred, as "the Katz analysis").
18 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting on "the Katz test (which has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan's separate concurrence in Katz)").
1

401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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affecting the rationale supporting On Lee or Lopez. 8 ' In contrast, Justice Harlan's dissent in White argued that subsequent
cases had eroded the "doctrinal foundations" of On Lee. According to Justice Harlan, Katz, in combination with other rulings
decided in the 1960's, not only expunged the property-law doctrine that previously controlled the results in search and seizure cases, it also cast serious doubt on the continuing validity
of cases like On Lee and Lopez.' The reasoning in Katz, following closely on the heels of Berger, signaled a heightened
judicial awareness of the dangers that technology posed to
individual privacy. Indeed, even without Katz, the Court had
already changed direction on the constitutionality of electronic
surveillance. Specifically, Justice Harlan noted that Berger "expressed concern about scientific developments that have put
within the reach of the Government the private communication
of 'anyone in almost any given situation,' [and] it left no doubt
that, as a general principle, electronic eavesdropping was an
invasion of privacy and that the Fourth Amendment prohibited
unsupervised 'ugging. " " In Justice Harlan's view, Katz was
simply the concluding chapter of the Court's new edition on the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Justices White and Harlan not only proffered different
views on Katz's specific holding, they also differed on Katz's
impact on Fourth Amendment theory. For Justice White, Katz's
impact was limited to overruling the trespass rule. Katz did not
affect the assumption of risk theory of prior cases, nor did it
represent a shift in judicial analysis in determining the Fourth
Amendment's reach."9 Justice Harlan, on the other hand,

" Justice White distinguished Katz by explaining that:
Katz involved no revelation to the Government by a party to conversations with the defendant nor did the Court indicate in any way that a
defendant has a justifiable and constitutionally protected expectation that
person with whom he is conversing will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police."
White, 401 U.S. at 749 (plurality opinion).
'ss Id. at 776-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 779 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 47 (1967)).
"9 Justice White saw no constitutional difference between wired and unwired
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questioned the compatibility of "risk analysis" and "expectations" theory with the Court's contemporary approach to defining the Fourth Amendment's reach. Although his opinions in
Lopez and Katz were crucial to the development of each of
these legal theories, Justice Harlan now believed that risk
analysis and expectations theory was neither consistent with
the holding of Katz nor compatible with the central purpose of
the Amendment.'9 1 Justice Harlan's comments seem to recognize that the analysis of Katz-relying as it does on the
individual's expectations-was an inadequate model for defining the Fourth Amendment's reach in an age of technological
innovation. For Harlan, merely describing the risks a person
assumes or subjective expectations he holds was a flawed model for identifying the Fourth Amendment's reach. The "critical
question" was whether the Court "should impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer without at
least the protection of a warrant requirement."'92 Unlike Justice White, who thought that a traditional "reasonableness"
model was capable of assessing the constitutionality of electronic surveillance, Justice Harlan appeared to be saying that the
Court must go further than simply asking what constitutes
reasonable police conduct. Instead, the Justices must examine
"the realm of values protected by the Fourth Amendment." 9 '

spies.
Given the
ating with
utterances
less if he

possibility or probability that one of his colleagues is cooperthe police, it is only speculation to assert that the defendant's
would be substantially different or his sense of security any
also thought it possible that the suspected colleague is wired

for sound.
White, 401 U.S. at 752 (plurality opinion). According to Justice White, government
use of wired and unwired informants "is ruled by fluid concepts of 'reasonableness." Id. at 753 (plurality opinion).
" See id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1I

Id.

IId. at 778; see also id. at 786-87 (arguing that the Court must assess "the
nature of a particular [police] practice and the likely extent of its impact on the

individual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a
technique of law enforcement. For those more extensive intrusions that significantly jeopardize the sense of security which is the paramount concern of Fourth

Amendment liberties, I am of the view that more than self-restraint by law enforcement officials is required and at the least warrants should be necessary.")
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A second illustration of the Court's internal discord over
the meaning of Katz occurred in the term following Katz. In
Desist v. United States," the Court had to decide whether
Katz's holding should be given retrospective application. When
Desist was decided, one of the criteria for determining whether
a new constitutional ruling would be given retroactive affect
focused on "the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards." 9 ' With this concern in mind,
the defendants in Desist argued that Katz "merely confirmed
the previous demise of obsolete decisions enunciating the distinction between 'trespassory' searches and those in which
there was no physical penetration of the protected premises."1 The Desist Court, however, concluded that this argument "misconstrues our opinion in Katz."'9 7 According to Justice Stewart, the author of Desist, on the day the Court decided
Katz, "the assumption persisted that electronic surveillance did
not offend the Constitution unless there was an 'actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."' Justice Stewart
conceded that decisions which preceded Katz "may have reflected growing dissatisfaction with the traditional tests of the
constitutional validity of electronic surveillance," but he noted
that the Court had never overruled those tests." Thus, while
the result in Katz "may have been foreshadowed, it was a clear
break with the past."" Accordingly, Desist ruled that Katz
would have only prospective application.
This understanding of Katz baffled Justice Fortas, who had
joined Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Katz itself. Justice
(citations omitted).
"'

394 U.S. 244 (1969).

Desist, 394 U.S. at 249 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297
(1967)). The other two criteria were: "the purpose to be served by the new standards" and "the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application
of the new standards." Id. The legal standards for retroactive application of Supreme Court precedents have changed since Desist was decided. See KAmLSAR
AL, supra note 18, at 41-47.
19 Desist, 394 U.S. at 247 (citations omitted).
197 Id.
'

x" Id. at 248.
9 Id.
200 Id.
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Fortas was certain that the trespass rule was dead long before
the Katz decision.20 1 But another aspect of the Court's failure
to apply Katz retrospectively troubled Justice Fortas. He noted
that the "vitality of our Constitution depends upon conceptual
faithfulness and not merely decisional obedience" that law enforcement officials and lower courts afford to the Court's precedents.20 2 By giving Katz only prospective application, the Desist Court sent two related messages to police officials and
lower court judges. One message encouraged police officials
"who honor the Constitution's mandate only where acceptable
to them or compelled by the precise and inescapable specifics of
a decision of this Court. 2°3 The second message that Desist
sent was more pointed. Prospective application of Katz awarded
dunce caps to those law enforcement officers, courts, and
public officials who do not merely stand by until an inevitable
decree issues from this Court, specifically articulating that
which is clearly immanent in the fulfillment of the Constitution, but who generously apply the mandates of the Constitution as the developing case law elucidates them.'
Justice Fortas's comments on the importance of "conceptual
faithfulness" to Supreme Court precedents help to identify a
basic problem with Katz. Justice Fortas's dissent in Desist was
a veiled criticism of law enforcement officers and judges who
took a narrow view of the Court's pre-Katz cases. Some of the
conservative Justices of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
encountered similar criticism for their application of Katz."°)

201

Using somewhat colorful language, Justice Fortas stated:

Katz is not responsible for killing Olmstead. Prior cases had left the

physical-trespass requirement of Olmstead virtually lifeless and merely
awaiting the death certificate that Katz gave it. They demonstrated to all

who were willing to receive the message that Olmstead would not shield
eavesdropping because it took place outside the physical property line.
Desist, 394 U.S. at 275 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
22

Id. at 277.

203

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 110-11 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,

204
205

dissenting) ("The Court's decision in this case veers sharply from the path marked
in Katz."); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
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But before police officers, lower court judges, and even Supreme Court Justices can be expected to honor the "conceptual
faithfulness" of a Court ruling, they have to know what that
ruling requires of them. The problem with Katz is that it was
so lacking in substance and subject to judicial manipulation
that it could mean anything to anyone.
The debate between Justices White and Harlan in White
and Justices Stewart and Fortas in Desist illustrate the problem that occurs when the Justices who decide a "landmark"
case like Katz disagree among themselves. For example, when
the Justices cannot agree whether a case fundamentally altered
the "rules of the game" regarding the constitutionality of electronic surveillance, '° that case is an unlikely protector of civil liberties in future cases involving technological and scientific
innovations that threaten Fourth Amendment rights. Similarly,
if within a year's time, the Justices who announce a ruling that
many legal scholars characterize as a revolutionary alteration
of the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment are deeply divided over whether that ruling "was a clear break with the
past," then that ruling should not be expected to generate consensus among future Justices regarding its meaning in other
constitutional contexts. Despite the apparent consensus among

("The opinion for a plurality of the Court reads almost as if [Katz] had never
been decided."); id. at 457 (plurality's position that helicopter surveillance of a
backyard is not a search "ignores the very essence of Katz"); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 216 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court "departs significantly from the standard developed in Katz"); Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 188 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Court's contention that,
because a field is not a house or effect, it is not covered by the Fourth Amendment is inconsistent with th[e] [Katz] line of cases and with the understanding of
the nature of constitutional adjudication from which it derives.") (footnote omitted).
206 Compare United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971) (plurality opinion of White, J.) ("We see no indication in Katz that the Court meant to disturb
[the "risk analysis" theory] or to disturb the result reached in the On Lee case,
nor are we now inclined to overturn this view of the Fourth Amendment.") (footnote omitted), with White, 401 U.S. at 780 (opinion of Harlan, J., dissenting)
(stating that Katz "added no new dimension to the law. At most it was a formal
dispatch of Olmstead and the notion that such problems may usefully be resolved
in the light of trespass doctrine, and, of course, it freed from speculation what
was already evident, that On Lee was completely open to question.").
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the Justices when they decided Katz, it soon became obvious
that the same Justices who participated in the Katz decision
could not agree on fundamental aspects of that ruling. When
this lack of consensus over the meaning of Katz is combined
with the emptiness of the legal norms that Katz announced, it
is not surprising to find that Katz has been a poor guardian of

Fourth Amendment rights.
III. WHAT IMPACT WILL KYLLO HAVE?

A. Kyllo's Impact on EarlierCases Limiting the
Scope of the FourthAmendment
The above discussion described the similarities of Katz and
Kyllo, and argued that Katz has been a weak protector of
Fourth Amendment rights. Kyllo's impact on search and seizure interests, of course, is uncertain at this point. I suspect,
however, that Kyllo, like Katz, is unlikely to prevent the use of
technology to monitor and reveal information helpful to law
enforcement officials. One reason why Kyllo's impact may be
blunted is because the Court may be unwilling to follow the
implications of Kyllo's holding in future cases. Consider, for
example, a couple of precedents that seem undermined by
Kyllo's logic.
When explaining why thermal imaging constituted a
search, Justice Scalia seemed annoyed with Justice Stevens's
numerous statements that thermal imaging did not reveal
information regarding the interior of the home. In Scalia's
view, "a thermal imager reveals the relative heat of various
rooms in the home." 7 Although that information was not
"particularly private or important," there was no basis for concluding it is not "information regarding the interior of the
home."2"' Justice Scalia also curtly dismissed Justice
Stevens's comparison of thermal imagining to what a passerby
might be able to observe by using ordinary human senses.2
207 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35, n.2 (2001).
208

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2.

2'9 According to Justice Stevens, "any member of the public might notice that

one part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby building if, for
example, rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates across its surfac-
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Justice Scalia noted that the dissent's comparison was "quite
irrelevant" because "[tihe fact that equivalent information could
sometimes be obtained by other means does not make lawful
the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment."2 10
Justice Scalia's conclusion that thermal imaging is a
search is more convincing than Justice Stevens's contrary judgment. But if Justice Scalia is correct to say that thermal imaging is a search because it reveals information regarding the
interior of the home, why isn't a police pen register-which also
reveals information regarding the interior of a home, to wit: the
telephone numbers dialed-a search? As noted earlier, Smith v.
Maryland held that a pen register was not a search.2 11 One
might try to distinguish Smith by arguing that a pen register
does not involve a police intrusion into the home, but a thermal
imager does not invade the home either. Both the government
and Justice Stevens emphasized that because a thermal imager
only detects heat that radiates from the external surface of a
home, it did not trigger Fourth Amendment protection, a point
that Justice Scalia did not contest.21 2

es." Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens's logic is reminiscent of
Chief Justice Burger's analysis in Ciraolo. In Ciraolo, Chief Justice Burger concluded that police use of an airplane to observe the defendant's backyard curtilage
was not a search because "[any member of the public flying in this airspace who
glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed." Ciraolo v.
California, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1985).
220 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35, n.2. Interestingly, Justice Scalia's rebuttal to Justice
Stevens's argument sounded more like Anthony Amsterdam than Warren Burger.
In his seminal article on the Fourth Amendment, Professor Amsterdam explained
why the availability of information from unofficial sources does not give the government carte blanche to utilize police methods to obtain that same information.
See Amsterdam, supra note 23 at 406-07 ("Every person who parks his or her car
on a side street in Greenwich Village voluntarily runs the risk that it will be
burglarized-a risk, I should add as one who has lived in Greenwich Village, that
is very much higher than the risk of betrayal by your friends even if you happen
to choose your friends exclusively from a circle of Machiavellian monsters. Does
that mean that government agents can break into your parked car uncontrolled
by the fourth amendment? Or pay the junkies to break into it?").
211 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
21 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41 (noting that the police observations "were made
with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data exposed on the outside
of petitioner's home but did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in
privacy") (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); id. at 44 ("equipment in this
case did not penetrate the walls of petitioner's home, and while it did pick up
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Alternatively, one might try to distinguish Smith by arguing that a homeowner assumes the risk that the police would
learn the numbers he dialed from his home because those numbers were revealed to the telephone company, which, in turn,
was free to provide the numbers to the police. Although the
Smith Court accepted that rationale, it is not a convincing legal
theory to measure the scope of the Fourth Amendment.2 13 But
even if one is persuaded by risk theory, that logic is equally
applicable to Danny Kyllo's case. Indeed, the court of appeals,
the Solicitor General's office, and Justice Stevens all endorsed
the notion that Kyllo assumed the risk that someone located
outside might detect the heat emanating from his home.2 14

'details of the home' that were exposed to the public, it did not obtain 'any information regarding the interior of the home.'); Brief for the United States at 19,
Kyllo (No. 99-8508) ("the imager did not literally or figuratively penetrate the
walls of petitioner's house and perceive private activities inside"); id. at 26 (stating that the thermal imager detected "only heat radiating from the external surface of the house").
213 See e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (noting that the "risk analysis" model of prior cases "lead to the substitution of words for analysis. The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search
for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present."); Slobogin, supra
note 28, at 1417 (noting that assumption of risk theory is "vacuous" in Kyllo:
"The most pertinent illustration of that fact is that until the Supreme Court
decision in Kyllo, in most jurisdictions we 'assumed the risk' that police subject
the interior of our houses to thermal imaging without obtaining a warrant or
developing any level of suspicion that evidence of a crime would be discovered.");
cf. Amsterdam, supra note 23, at 470, n.492 ("The question is whether the
[Flourth [A]mendment regulates the activity of the police in dispatching spies to
insinuate themselves into people's confidences and homes .... If it does not,
then the government may unleash its spies on any of us, criminals or not; and
talk about 'criminals' assuming the risks means that we all assume the risks.");
Baldwin v. United States 450 U.S. 1045 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In
Baldwin, the Court denied certiorari to review the claim that a search occurred
when an undercover agent, who had obtained a position as the defendant's handyman and chauffeur, obtained samples of cocaine from the defendant's home.
Baldwin, 405 U.S. at 1045. Justice Marshall complained that under the logic of
the lower court, "the Government need never satisfy the probable-cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment if, by disguising its officers as repairmen, babysitters, neighbors, maids, and the like, it is able to gain entry into
an individual's home by ruse rather than force in order to conduct a search." Id.
at 1049 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
214 See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F. 3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining
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According to Justice Stevens, society is unlikely to suffer from
"a rule requiring the rare homeowner who both intends to engage in uncommon activities that produce extraordinary
amounts of heat, and wishes to conceal that production from
outsiders, to make sure that the surrounding area is well insulated."215
Moreover there are additional similarities between a thermal imager and a pen register. In Kyllo, Justice Scalia explained that a search occurs whenever police use "sense-enhancing technology [to obtain] any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."2 16 Under this standard, a pen register is also a
search because it is technology that enables the police to obtain
information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into
the home. The pen register reveals the numbers dialed on a
home telephone that would otherwise be unavailable unless
officers were inside the home to observe the dialing.2 17 Furthermore, a pen register is not a device generally used by the
public. 2"8 And finally, the pen register reveals details about

that Kyllo "took no affirmative action to conceal the waste heat emissions created
by the heat lamps needed for a success indoor grow"); Brief for United States at
25, Kyllo (No. 99-8508) ("When a government investigator is in a public place and
uses technology to observe an area exposed to the public; it does not constitute a
search, provided that technology does not directly detect private activity (or other
private details) occurring in a private area."); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1
216 Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
217 Of course, one might argue that because the police could subpoena a
person's telephone records and obtain information about the numbers dialed within a home, the Fourth Amendment does not bar the police from obtaining that
same information pursuant to a pen register. Under Kyllo's analysis, however, a
pen register does not become a non-search simply because the information revealed by the pen register is available from other sources. Id. at 35, n.2 ("The
fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by other means does
not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment.").
218 See Carrie L. Groskopf, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Supreme Court's
Unnecessary Departure From Precedent in Kyllo v. United States, 52 DEPAUL L.
REv. 201, 243 (2002) ("A pen register, in fact, is a device geared specifically for
law enforcement purposes, and not for individual use. It would seem then, that
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the home. Indeed, a pen register provides more revealing and
intimate details about the home than a thermal imager. While
a thermal imager measures relative amounts of heat that may
be escaping the home, a pen register identifies the people and
organizations called by a homeowner, and thus reveals "the
most intimate details of a person's life."219
In sum, the legal analysis that dictates the conclusion that
thermal imaging is a search also compels the conclusion that a
pen register is a search. Despite the parallels between a thermal imager and a pen register, Justice Scalia made no effort to
reconcile Kyllo's holding with Smith v. Maryland.' This is
not to suggest that the Justices comprising the Kyllo majority
are ready to reconsider or overrule Smith. If forced to revisit
the constitutionality of pen registers, it is highly likely that the
current Court would reaffirm Smith's holding notwithstanding
the result in Kyllo. That said, Justice Scalia's silence regarding
Smith is worth mentioning. Notwithstanding the shared traits
between a thermal imager and a pen register, Justice Scalia's
analysis in Kyllo proceeds forward oblivious to the tension
between Kyllo's holding that thermal imaging is a search and
Smith's ruling that a pen register is not a search. Conceivably,
Justice Scalia did not notice the tension between Kyllo's holding and Smith's holding, although that is an unlikely scenario
since a number of law professors immediately recognized the
tension."' Perhaps, Justice Scalia's silence was compelled by

under the reasoning of Kyllo, because a pen register is arguably not considered to
be commonly available to the general public, the employment of a pen register
should be unconstitutional.") (footnote omitted).
210 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"'
While Justice Scalia did not attempt to reconcile his logic with Smith's
holding, Justice Stevens argued that technological equipment that disclosed "only
the relative volume of sound leaving [a telephone] booth, which presumably was
discernible in the public domain," would be constitutional under Smith's holding.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 49-50, n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2' See e.g., Joshua Dressler, posting on Jan. 17, 2002 (copy on file with author) ("Of course, after Kyllo last year, one can seriously question whether Smith
v. Maryland can be justified on any reasonable basis of principle. If a thermal
imager used outside a house to detect heat levels inside a house is unconstitutional (in the absence of a warrant), one wonders why the rule should be different in the case of a pen register obtaining phone calling activities inside."). But
cf. Norman M. Garland, posting on Jan. 17, 2002 (copy on file with author) ("I

20021

KAT,

KYLLO, AND TECHNOLOGY

the need to maintain the vote of one or more members of the
Kyllo majority who were unwilling to join an opinion that cast
doubt on the result in Smith. Whatever the explanation, at
some point in the future, the Court may be forced to address
the conflict between Kyllo and Smith. When that happens, my
prediction is that the Court will confine Kyllo's reasoning to its
special facts, reaffirm Smith's holding, and find that the Fourth
Amendment presents no obstacles to using technology that is
the functional equivalent of a pen register.222
Another precedent that Kyllo's reasoning undermines is
United States v. Place." Place permitted police use of another type of technology-albeit canine technology-that has impacted Fourth Amendment rights.2" Place held that a canine
sniff of luggage that discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics is not a search.225 In his Kyllo dissent, Justice
think that [Kyllol reaffirms the validity of the Smith case. Scalia, for the majority, cites Smith to distinguish it from the case before it."). I think that Professor
Garland places too much weight on Justice Scalia's citation of Smith. Justice
Scalia's sole reference to Smith occurs in Part II of his opinion which describes
the law concerning police activities that trigger Fourth Amendment protection. As
Professor Garland notes, Justice Scalia states that the Katz test has been applied
"in holding that it is not a search for the police to use a pen register at the
phone company to determine what numbers were dialed in a private home, Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-744 (1979)." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33. Scalia then
explains that Kyllo "involves officers on a public street engaged in more than
naked-eye surveillance of a home," and comments that the Court has "previously
reserved judgment as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage point, if any, is too much." Id. Justice Scalia's standard of review is announced in Part III of his opinion. See Id. at 34. After announcing that standard, Justice Scalia never compares or contrasts the holding in
Smith with the standard established in Kyllo. Thus, rather than distinguish
Smith's holding from the rule announced in Kyllo, Justice Scalia is, at best, indifferent to Smith, and makes no effort to reconcile his own reasoning with Smith's
analysis and holding.
'z See infra notes 343-59 and accompanying text.
22
462 U.S. 696 (1983).
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
Id. In a rather casual manner, and without prompting a dissent, Place's
holding was extended to automobiles in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40
(2000). Edmond ruled that a narcotics vehicle checkpoint was an unreasonable
seizure because its primary purpose was law enforcement related. Edmond, 531
U.S. at 48. As it did in Place, the Edmond Court reached out to decide the constitutionality of a narcotics dog sniff of an automobile, even though that issue
was unrelated to the central issue before the Court. Id. at 40. Speaking for the
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Stevens complained that the Court's rule would cover devices
that are designed to detect emissions coming from a house."6
Justice Stevens sensibly noted Place's holding would authorize
"sense-enhancing equipment that identifies nothing but illegal
activity." 7 According to Justice Stevens, Place's holding has
been diluted because use of a mechanical dog or other type of
technology directed at home that might detect "the odor of
deadly bacteria or chemicals for making a new type of high
explosive" would be illegal under Kyllo's reasoning.'
Interestingly, Justice Scalia chose not to respond to Justice
Stevens's comments on the future viability of Place's holding
concerning technological devices that provide information regarding the interior of a home. Justice Scalia's silence on this
point is even more perplexing than his refusal to discuss Kyllo's
impact on Smith's holding for two reasons. First, the conflict
between Kyllo and extending Place's holding to cover technological devices that reveal information about the inside of a home
is even more striking than the tension between Kyllo and
Smith. A dog sniff, whether mechanical or not, that detects the
odor of contraband or deadly bacteria coming from a home is
easily covered by Kyllo's rule that a search occurs whenever
"sense-enhancing technology [enables the police to obtain] any
information regarding the interior of [a] home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into
[the home]. '" 229 Second, when Kyllo was under review by the

Court, an influential federal court of appeals had already ruled
that Place's holding should not be extended to private
homes." ° It would be surprising that the Court was unaware
of this development when deciding Kyllo. 21

majority, Justice O'Connor, relying exclusively on Place, ruled that a canine sniff

of a car is not a search. Id.
'
227

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.

2u

Id. at 48.

2n Id. at 34.
2"0 United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
...Professor LaFave's treatise gives prominent attention to Thomas. See
LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.2(f) at 459. LaFave also highlights that the validity of
Thomas's legal analysis was questioned in United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469
(D.C. Cir. 1989), which ruled that a dog sniff of a roomette in a train was not a
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Moreover, several lower court judges have acknowledged
the conflict between Kyllo and Place."2 Although the lower
courts have reached different results on the constitutionality of
canine sniffs in various contexts, several judges have commented that Kyllo "appears to run counter to the analytical basis of
the 'dog sniff' rule."23 My emphasis on the tension between
Kyllo and Place is not to predict that the Kyllo majority is
poised to overrule or reconsider Place. Indeed, during the same
Term that Kyllo was decided, the Court unanimously held in
Indianapolis v. Edmond"4 that a dog sniff of an automobile
was not a search, and cited Place as the controlling precedent.
Of course, under the Court's precedents, cars and containers
found therein are not entitled to the same privacy interests
that are afforded to homes, 5 but luggage is normally entitled
to more privacy than cars, 6 unless, of course, the luggage is
found inside an automobile. 7
search. See LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.2(f) at 460.
2"2 See, e.g. United States v. Richard, No. CRIM 01-20048-01,

2001 WL

1033421, at *6 n.4 (W.D. La., 2001); State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W. 2d 125, 130
(Minn. 2002); People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 671 n.2 (Colo. 2001); State v.
Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Iowa 2001); State v. Miller, 647 N.W.2d 348,
355 n.2 (Wis. App. 2002) (Dykman, J. concurring).
222 Richard, 2001 WL 1033421, at *6 n.4. See also Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d
at
138 (Page, J., concurring) ("I do not see a distinction between sense-enhancementby-technology and sense-enhancement-by canine."); Haley, 41 P.3d at 671 n.2 ("In
our view, the logic of [Kyllo's] holding undercuts the prosecution's argument that
dog sniffs of the outside of an automobile to detect the contents thereof do not
fall within a reasonable expectation of privacy.").
234

531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).

2" See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). Chief Justice Burger's opin-

ion in Carney held that the "automobile exception"-which permits warrantless
searches of cars provided there is probable cause-controlled the search of a motor-home that was found in a public parking lot. Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-94.
2
See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). Chadwick held that a
warrantless search of a footlocker was unconstitutional, even though there was
probable cause to believe it contained contraband. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15-16.
In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court pointedly rejected the
government's argument that the automobile exception should equally apply to
movable containers, and that the warrant requirement should be confined to
searches of homes and other areas of "core" privacy interests. Id. at 11-13.
27 A description of the intricacies and absurdities of the Court's automobile
search doctrine is beyond the scope of this article. Cases such as Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), and
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) are examples of the Court's most re-
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My point is not to predict the demise of Place. Rather, my
contention is that Kyllo undercuts the argument that a dog
sniff of an apartment or a roomette on a train is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment. Like a thermal imager, a canine
sniff is a law enforcement device that allows the police to obtain information regarding the interior of a home or other protected area that could not otherwise have been obtained without a physical intrusion." Of course, dogs, more so than pen
registers, electronic beepers and airplanes are generally available to the public, 9 which may make Kyllo's reasoning incent pronouncements in this area.
"

Cf Thomas K Clancy, Coping with Technological Change: Kyllo and the

Proper Analytical Structure to Measure The Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights,
72 Miss. L.J. 525, 557 (2002) (asserting that the "logic of [Kyllo's] analysis surely
must apply to all technological devices that detect information about the interior
of the home"). At least one lower court has intimated that Kyllo does not affect
canine sniffs because a dog sniff is not "technology' within the meaning of the
Kyllo's holding. See Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 130 n.3. In Wiegand, the Minnesota
Supreme Court distinguished the facts involved there, namely, a dog sniff of a
car, by stating: "We are not faced with the issue of a dog sniff around a home,
nor are we faced with an investigative technique involving a piece of technology
with the potential for dramatic technological advancements." Id.; see also Haley,
41 P.3d at 677-78 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's argument that
Kyllo undermines Place's logic: "A dog sniff is not a technological advancement
that invites the same sort of concern [present in Kyllo].). That conclusion misses
the point of Kyllo. Justice Scalia specifically noted that the Court had "reserved
judgment as to how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from
[a public] vantage point, if any, is too much." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
33 (2001). Canine sniffs undoubtedly enhance the ordinary sensory faculties of
police officers. In fact, police "use of a dog is not a mere improvement of their
sense of smell, as ordinary eye glasses improve vision, but is a significant enhancement accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory instrument."
United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985). While it is imaginable that a police officer, using her ordinary senses, might be able to discern the
same information that a thermal imager reveals, see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building, particularly if it is
vented, as was the case here."), the dog sniff does what no ordinary person can
do. See Harris, supra note 119, at 24 n.137 ("Although both man and dog can
smell, the dog's nose was not simply a way to enhance what the human at the
end of the leash could do. Rather, the canine nose is so much better-more sensitive and more accurate-than its human counterpart that it simply could not be
said to replace it.").
239 At least one state supreme court justice, however, has stated that a contraband sniffing dog should not be considered technology in general public use. See
Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 138 (Page, J., concurring specially) ("In this case, the
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applicable to canine sniffs."4° As others have already noted,
however, whether a particular device is in general public use
should have no impact on Fourth Amendment analysis.2"
House burglars are prevalent too, but because I run the risk
that my home may be burglarized does not mean that a warrantless police invasion of my house is not a search. Likewise,
if technology gives the government access that is the functional
equivalent of physical presence in my home, the general availability of that technology should not make a difference when
deciding whether the government's use of that technology constitutes a search. A dog sniff is a search because it provides the
functional equivalent of actual presence in the area being targeted.
Sooner or later, the Court will have the opportunity to
address the conflict between Kyllo and Place. When that occasion arises, my prediction is the Court will give Kyllo a narrow
reading and extend Place's holding to authorize dog sniffs of
private residences. 2 If my guess is correct, a major element

sense-enhancing dog sniff, not in general public use, obtained information regarding the interior of the vehicle .. ..
) (emphasis added).
'
Whether the "general public use" rule is part of Kyllo's holding is uncertain. "It is worth noting that the Kyllo majority never firmly adopted the general
public use doctrine. In a footnote, it stated that general public use 'may' be a
factor in the search analysis, and intimated it might 'reexamine' this factor in the
future." Slobogin, supra note 28, at 1432 n.179 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 n.6).
241 Justice Stevens correctly asserted that a "general public use" rule is "perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than
recede, as the use of intrusive equipment become more readily available." Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a compelling critique of the "general
public use" factor apparently established in Kyllo, see Slobogin, supra note 28. In
a pre-Kyllo article, Professor David Harris also pointed out the flaws in having
the scope of the Fourth Amendment turn on what technology is generally available to the public. Harris, supra note 119, at 23 (noting that the "type of technology the public can possess may change with surprising speed. Worse, the Court's
reasoning implies that citizens somehow assume the risk of being observed by
whatever technology the government can muster for its crime-fighting efforts.").
24 The Court will probably distinguish Kyllo in this context by explaining that
a dog sniff only detects "the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.
Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the
contents of the [home], the information obtained is limited." Place, 462 U.S. at
707. In contrast, the information disclosed by a thermal imager is not limited to
detecting contraband. A recent lower court holding supports my prediction. See
Porter v. Texas, No. 14-01-0177-CR to 14-01-0179-CR, 2002 WL 31008148 (Tex.
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of Kyllo's framework will be diluted and the Court will have,
literally and figuratively, "opened the doors" of people's homes
to various types of technological devices that can selectively
identify emissions coming from a home."
In sum, Kyllo's impact on future Fourth Amendment doctrine may be limited because Justice Scalia's opinion conflicts
with key aspects of search and seizure law that currently permit technological and other sense-enhancing instruments to be
used to gather information about "the most intimate details of
a person's life."2' Unless the Court is prepared to overrule (or
severely limit) cases like Smith v. Maryland and United States
v. Place (and there is no hint in Kyllo that the Court is ready to
do this), the "right" announced in Kyllo will most likely be confined to a privilege against the use of a thermal imager directed at one's home." 5
App. Sept. 5, 2002). Porter held that a dog sniff of a home is not a search. Porter, 2002 WL 31008148 at *3. The Porter court explained that a dog sniff only
discloses whether or not contraband is present and that a person does not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in possessing contraband. Id See also, George M.
Dery III, The Loss of Privacy Is Just a Heartbeat Away: An Exploration of Government Heartbeat Detection Technology and Its Impact on Fourth Amendment
Protections, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 401, 412-13 (1999) (noting that the rule
emerging from Place and Jacobsen is that if officials utilize devices that are "so
precise as to identify nothing but illegally-possessed items, then the surveillance
did not constitute a search"); Simmons, supra note 120, at 1352, n.208 ("[S]ince
the Court in Jacobsen essentially held that there is no legitimate privacy interest
in possessing illegal substances, the Court could easily harmonize the Kyllo test
with the Place doctrine by confirming that Kyllo only applies to areas, activities
and items in which an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy. The
specific language used in Kyllo already implies this, since it limits the test to
'details of the home,' which clearly deserve constitutional protection."); cf Michael
Adler, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L. J. 1093, 1098 (1996) (considering the
Fourth Amendment implications of a "perfect search"-a computer program that
would scan a hard drive and "report only the presence or absence of an exact
copy of a certain piece of illegal modified software," and would "ignore everything
else on the disk, no matter how blatantly illegal--or sensationally intriguing-a
human investigator might find that information.").
2' Cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[P]ublic officials should
not have to avert their senses or their equipment from detecting emissions in the
public domain such as excessive heat, traces of smoke, suspicious odors, odorless
gases, airborne particulates, or radioactive emissions, any of which could identify
hazards to the community.").
2" Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
' A few lower courts have already hinted that Kyllo's holding does not extend
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B. Kyllo and Bright-Line Rules

The second reason to question Kyllo's impact on future
cases focuses not on technology or scientific innovation, but on
old-fashion Fourth Amendment doctrine. As noted earlier, Justice Scalia's opinion stressed the importance of bright-line
rules, which provide guidance to police officers and judges who
must follow and apply the Court's search and seizure doctrine.
According to Justice Scalia, a clear constitutional rule was vital
in Kyllo because "the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at
the entrance to the house.' That line, we think, must be not
only firm but also bright-which requires clear specification of
those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.""6 Justice Stevens' dissent ridiculed the quality and clarity of Justice
Scalia's per se rule, describing it as both "far too broad" and
"too narrow," depending on the context. 7 To the surprise of

to the use of a thermal imager to scan premises other than the home, such as
commercial premises. See United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638, 646 (6th Cir.
2002) ("While Kyllo broadly protects homes against warrantless thermal imaging,
the case before us involves the use of a thermal image to scan the Elkinses'
commercial buildings.") (emphasis added); State v. Mordowanec, 788 A.2d 54
(Conn. 2002) ("The Kyllo decision did not address the question of whether a
search warrant would be required to conduct a thermal imaging scan of premises
other than a home, such as a commercial property. The court emphasized, however, the heightened expectation of privacy in one's home and distinguished that
heightened expectation from the lesser expectation of privacy in a commercial
property."). Although these cases did not resolve the constitutional issue at stake,
they surely indicate a reluctance to extend Kyllo's reach beyond a private home.
"
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (citation omitted).
As noted above, see supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text, Justice
Stevens asserted that Kyllo's rule was too broad because it would "embrace potential mechanical substitutes for dogs trained to react when they sniff narcotics,"
which would undermine the result and reasoning in Place. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also contended that Kyllo's rule was
unnecessarily broad because it covers any information regarding the interior of a
home. Id. "If it takes sensitive equipment to detect an odor that identifies criminal conduct and nothing else, the fact that the odor emanates from the interior
of a home should not provide it with constitutional protection." Id. at 48. At the
same time, Justice Stevens criticized Kyllo's holding as being too narrow.
Clearly, a rule that is designed to protect individuals from the overly
intrusive use of sense-enhancing equipment should not be limited to a
home. If such equipment did provide its user with the functional equivalent of access to a private place-such as, for example, the telephone
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many Court-watchers, Justice Stevens preferred giving politicians "an unimpeded opportunity" to resolve future developments concerning technology and Fourth Amendment rights,
"rather than to shackle them with prematurely devised constitutional restraints."2 "8
The important point here is not deciding who makes the
better argument on the need for bright-line rules in the context
of thermal imaging, but rather that Justice Scalia's conclusion
on the need for per se rules is not likely to change or effect
future Fourth Amendment doctrine, no matter how persuasive
his arguments may have been in Kyllo. The Court's zigzag
approach on the appropriateness of bright-lines in search and
seizure cases is notorious.2 9 There is no neutral principle explaining the Court's willingness to use (or not use) bright-line
rules. "[Biright lines will be applied when the Court decides to
apply them."2s There is no reason to think that Kyllo will alter this situation. Justice Scalia's triumph in Kyllo in persuading a majority of his colleagues on the benefits of bright-line
rules will likely be a temporary victory.
The Court's most recent cases demonstrate how unlikely it
is that Kyllo's preference for bright-line rules will have a lasting impact. In the same Term in which Kyllo adopted a per se
rule for determining whether thermal imaging was a search,
the Court adopted a balancing analysis rather than a per se
rule in another case involving the scope of protection the
Fourth Amendment provides for the home. Decided four

booth involved in Katz, or an office building-then the rule should apply
to such an area as well as to the home.
Id. at 48-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 51.
"9 See generally, Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth
Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 227 (1984); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth
Amendment In An Imperfect World: On Drawing 'Bright Lines" and "Good Faith",
43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 307 (1982); cf Tracey Macin, The Fourth Amendment on the
Freeway, [hereinafter, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway], 3 RUtGERS RACE
& L. REV. 117, 151-57 (2001) (arguing that the Court has yet to articulate a
principled rule for deciding when a bright-line rule controls a Fourth Amendment
issue involving a traffic stop).
' Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway, supra note 249, at 157.
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months prior to Kyllo, Illinois v. McArthur25 concerned
whether police, who had probable cause that marijuana was in
a home, could seize the home and prevent the homeowner from
entering his premises unaccompanied by an officer for approximately two hours while a search warrant was being obtained. 2 The Court concluded that the seizure was lawful.

253

Two police officers accompanied Charles McArthur's wife
when she went to his trailer-home to remove her belongings. 2' When the wife and the officers arrived, McArthur was
inside his home. 25 5 The officers remained outside while the
wife retrieved her possessions."6 After gathering her belongings, the wife informed the officers that McArthur had concealed "'some dope underneath the couch."' 7 The officers
then knocked on the door and requested permission to search
the home.' McArthur denied the request while standing outside his trailer. 9 The officer in charge then told McArthur
that he could not reenter his home without a police escort.W
The second officer left the scene to obtain a search warrant.2 "'
Two hours later, authorized by a search warrant, the police
searched McArthur's home and found a small amount of mari-

25

"
"
2m

531 U.S. 326 (2001).
McArthur, 531 U.S. at 329.

Id. at 331.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 328-29.
Id. at 329.

Id.
Id.
"' Id. The officer in charge could not "recall whether he told [McArthur] to
come out of the trailer or if [McArthur] came out on his own." People v.
McArthur, 713 N.E.2d 93, 94 (Il. App. 4 Dist. 1999), reversed, 531 U.S. 326
(2001). McArthur's presence inside his home was a critical factor in the lower
court's decision to sustain McArthur's Fourth Amendment claim. See McArthur,
713 N.E.2d at 98. For a discussion of why this point was critical to the constitutional issue in McArthur, see Craig M. Bradley, Illinois v. McArthur: Preserving
Evidence Pending Search Warrants, TRIAL, JUNE 2001, at 70; Tracey Maclin, Let
Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why The Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment
History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 934-35 (2002).
57
258

21 McArthur, 531 U.S. at 329.
261 Id.
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juana and drug paraphernalia under the sofa. 2
McArthur was charged with two misdemeanor offenses.'
The Illinois judiciary sustained his claim that the police seizure
of his home violated the Fourth Amendment, but Justice
Breyer's opinion reached a different conclusion.2' According
to Justice Breyer, the central requirement of the Fourth
Amendment is "reasonableness.""5 He explained that the
Court interprets reasonableness "as establishing rules and
presumptions designed to control conduct of law enforcement
officers that may significantly intrude upon privacy interests."2" Sometimes reasonableness requires warrants, but not
always. Considering the totality of the circumstances in
McArthur, Justice Breyer would not say "that the warrantless
seizure was per se unreasonable." 7 Rather than announcing
a bright-line rule, McArthur "balance[d] the privacy-related and
law enforcement related concerns to determine if the intrusion
was reasonable."' Under a balancing formula, Justice Breyer
concluded that the seizure was reasonable. 269
Why does the Court adopt a bright-line rule in Kyllo, but
prefer a balancing test in McArthur, even though both cases
concern the sanctity and security of a home? One might say
that because Kyllo involved the "threshold" issue of whether a
search occurred, a per se rule is necessary to provide guidance
for police officers. If the challenged police conduct does not
involve a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-

id.
Id. McArthur was charged with unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia
and marijuana (less than 2.5 grams).
26 Id. at 329-31.
262
2"

2. Id. at 330.
2

Id.

at 330.

Id. at 331. According to Justice Breyer, the facts involved "a plausible
claim" of exigent circumstances. He also noted that the seizure was tailored to
the police need, was limited in time and scope, and avoided "significant intrusion
into the home itself." Id.
Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) and United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873 (1975) which were not "house" cases).
2" Id. For a critique of McArthur and an explanation why McArthur failed to
address the crucial issue confronting the Court, see Bradley, supra note 259, at
70 (arguing that "the issue here is not one of sealing unoccupied premises but of
seizing an occupied dwelling and ejecting the occupant").
267
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ment, police officers need not worry about the "reasonableness"
of their actions. They are free to proceed without obtaining a
warrant, and they need not worry whether they have probable
cause or reasonable suspicion of criminality to justify their
intrusion. On the other hand, in McArthur there was no question that a seizure had occurred. Thus, the "threshold" issue of
whether the police conduct triggered Fourth Amendment scrutiny was not on the table. The only question confronting the
Court concerned the "reasonableness" of the seizure. Reasonableness generally-although not always-requires a consideration of the totality of the circumstances.
If this explanation accurately describes the Court's approach, then Kyllo and McArthur-rather than illustrate the
Court's unprincipled approach toward bright-line
rules--demonstrate a coherent theme. But the two most recent
cases involving whether a police intrusion constitutes a search,
Minnesota v. Carter270 and Bond v. United States, 7 ' cast
doubt on the validity of this explanation. An earlier discussion
noted the differences between Kyllo, which adopted a brightline rule, and Minnesota v. Carter, which eschewed a per se
rule for determining whether guests or visitors will have an expectation of privacy in their host's home. 2 Although both
Carter and Kyllo involved the threshold issue of whether a
search occurred, the Court took divergent paths to resolve this
issue."'
Carter is not the only recent case where the Rehnquist
Court avoids bright-line rules for determining whether a search
has occurred. Bond v. United States,274 decided a year before
Kyllo, concerned whether an officer's squeeze of luggage triggered Fourth Amendment protection."' Steven Dewayne
Bond was a passenger on an interstate bus that was stopped at
a border patrol checkpoint in Texas. An immigration officer

"0 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
271

529 U.S. 334 (2000).

See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
I7 Compare Carter, 525 U.S. at 91 with Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
172

274

529 U.S. 334 (2000).

1'

Bond, 529 U.S. at 335.
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squeezed Bond's canvas bag that was in the overhead compartment. The officer felt a "brick-like" object inside. A search of
the bag revealed a "brick" of methamphetamine. The issue
before the Court was whether the officer's squeeze constituted
a search.2 76 Writing for a seven Justice majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist ruled that the squeeze was a search. First, the Chief
Justice explained that the officer's motive for touching the bag
was irrelevant to the constitutional issue.27 7 He then explained that while a bus passenger may expect that others will
handle his luggage, a passenger "does not expect that other
passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel
the bag in an exploratory manner."27 Because the officer's
squeeze was probing rather than the equivalent of what a passenger might do to create more room in the overhead rack, the
Chief Justice held that a search occurred.27 9
In sum, Carter and Bond demonstrate that the Rehnquist
Court is not devoted to bright-line rules when determining the
scope of the Fourth Amendment. Notwithstanding sensible
arguments to the contrary,' ° the Court established a legal
framework where the constitutional rights of house guests and
interstate travelers will depend on a balancing process that will
be initially conducted by police officers who may be disinclined
to respect the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals. Unlike
the per se rule announced in Kyllo, the totality tests of Carter
and Bond afford scant guidance to officers interested in knowing whether their actions trigger constitutional safeguards. In
sum, the reasoning and results in Kyllo, Carter and Bond illus216

Id.

at 35-36.
at 338 n.2 ("[Tihe issue is not his state of mind, but the objective

277 See Id.

effect of his actions.").
278

Id. at 338-39.

278 Id.
2"

at 339.
See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 106-09 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-

ing) (explaining why social guests and visitors should be entitled to rely on the
privacy of their host's home). In Bond, Justice Breyer contended that the reasoning in that case "will lead to a constitutional jurisprudence of 'squeezes,' thereby
complicating further already complex Fourth Amendment law, increasing the difficulty of deciding ordinary criminal matters, and hindering the administrative
guidance (with its potential for control of unreasonable police practices) that a
less complicated jurisprudence might provide." Bond, 529 U.S. at 342 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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trate that the Court has yet to articulate a coherent rationale
for deciding when a bright-line rule will be used to resolve
whether a police intrusion constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment.
Even if one believes that threshold cases justify the use of
per se rules and cases resolving the "reasonableness" of a challenged search or seizure should be resolved under a balancing
formula, this distinction does not account for the methodology
utilized in McArthur. As noted above, the Court has afforded
the home the most scrupulous protection under the Fourth
Amendment."' To promote the home's security, the Court has
essentially adopted a per se rule regarding police intrusions
into the home: "[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm
line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a
warrant." 2 Granted, the police action in McArthur did not
involve a forcible search or entry into a home, but it did breach
the security McArthur enjoyed in his home. McArthur was
inside his home when the police knocked and requested permission to search inside. When McArthur denied permission, he
was forcibly detained outside his home while a search warrant
was obtained. 3 This action certainly implicated the Fourth
Amendment's explicit guarantee of a right "to be secure" in
one's home.' Also, the need for police action in McArthur

281 See notes 91-100 and accompany text.

' Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); see also Kirk v. Louisiana,
122 S. Ct. 2458, 2459 (2002) ("police officers need either a warrant or probable
cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home").
28 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 329 (2001).
284 Although there was no forcible entry of his home, McArthur's right to enjoy
full possession of his home and right to be secure within his home was disturbed
by the police action. Cf Clancy, supra note 238, at 541 (explaining that "the essential attribute of the right to be secure is the ability of the individual to exclude the government from intruding. Thus ....
as to a seizure of property, the
individual may exercise the right to remain in possession ....
This ability to
exclude is so essential to the exercise of the right to be secure that is proper to
say that it is the equivalent to the right-the right to be secure is the right to
exclude."); Clancy, supra note 1, at 357 (same); Adler, supra note 242, at 1120
(asserting that "the Founders' ultimate desire was not that the government be
reasonable but rather that the people be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects").
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was less urgent than the justification rejected in Welsh v. Wisconsin," which held the gravity of an offense is an important
factor to consider when deciding whether exigency exists to
justify a warrantless arrest inside a home. 6
Concededly, reasonable minds can differ over whether the
Court correctly resolved the issue at stake in McArthur. 7 My
concern here is not whether the Court correctly decided the
merits in McArthur; instead, my focus is on the methodology
that the Court used to resolve the merits. Police intrusions that
affect the security and sanctity of the home have traditionally
been resolved by bright-line rules." s McArthur bucks that

2a

466 U.S. 740 (1984).

2W Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. The police arrested Welsh inside his home without

a warrant after they developed probable cause that Welsh had been driving while
intoxicated. The state argued that exigent circumstances justified the arrest because evidence of Welsh's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while waiting
for a warrant to be secured. Id. at 753. The Welsh Court, however, invalidated
the arrest because the state classified the offense "as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment was possible." Id. at 754 (citation omitted). In fact, Welsh moves close to announcing a per se rule against warrantless
entries for arrest in cases of minor crimes. See id. at 753 ("We note that it is
difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor.");
id. ("[A]pplication of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home
entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that
only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been committed.").
In McArthur, Justice Breyer distinguishes Welsh on two grounds. McArthur,
531 U.S. at 336. First, he states that McArthur was detained for a jailable"
offense, whereas Welsh involved a "'nonjailable offense. Id. Second, he notes that
the seizure involved in McArthur "is considerably less intrusive" than a police
entry into a home to affect a warrantless arrest. Id. On the issue of exigency,
Justice Breyer states that the facts in McArthur involve "a plausible claim" of
exigent circumstances. Id. at 331.
" Professor Bradley calls the issue at stake in McArthur a "festering issue:
When may police act to preserve evidence pending the arrival of a search warrant
when they fear that someone inside the building may destroy the evidence?"
Bradley, supra note 259, at 73.
2U Exceptions to this statement may be Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)
and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997). Buie held that the police may,
while effecting the arrest of a felon in his home pursuant to an arrest warrant,
conduct a protective sweep of a home when they have reasonable suspicion that
the premises harbor an individual posing a danger to the officers or others. Buie,
494 U.S. at 337. Richards ruled that an unannounced entry into a home is permissible where the police have reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing
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trend, but its explanations for eschewing a bright-line rule are
hardly satisfying. 9 On the other hand, Kyllo, decided four
months after McArthur, utilizes a bright-line rule to determine
whether police conduct directed at a home implicates the
Fourth Amendment."9°

their presence and purpose would threaten officer safety or risk the destruction of
evidence. Richards, 520 U.S. at 395.
2' McArthur, 531 U.S. at 336. Justice Breyer explains that under the circumstances, "we cannot say that the warrantless seizure was per se unreasonable." Id.
at 331. He then proffers two reasons for this conclusion. First, the facts involved
"a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances." Id. Second, he notes that the seizure of McArthur "was
tailored to that need, being limited in time and scope, and avoiding significant
intrusion into the home itself." Id. Justice Breyer's first justification for the seizure-"a plausible claim" of exigency--"is a concept unknown in the Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and [he] made no effort to explain it." Maclin,
supra note 259, at 935 n.182. Judges and police officers will undoubtedly have
trouble determining the difference between exigent circumstances, which permits a
warrantless entry of a home to effect an arrest or search, see Minnesota v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91, 101 (1990), and "a plausible claim" of exigency, which, after
McArthur permits something less than a full-blown seizure of a home, and an
implausible claim of exigency, which presumably would not have permitted the
seizure upheld in McArthur. Justice Breyer's second justification for upholding the
seizure-it was "both limited and tailored reasonably to secure law enforcement
needs while protecting privacy interests"-typfies the fact-specific balancing often
seen in Justice Breyer's search and seizure opinions. See, e.g., Bd. of Ed. v. Earls,
122 S. Ct. 2559, 2569-71 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (listing factors that make
drug testing program valid); Wyoming v. Houghton 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (distinguishing between searching a woman's purse found
on the backseat of a car, and searching a purse "attached to her person"); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 103-05 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that
the record did not support the factual conclusions of the lower court's determination that an officer's conduct constituted a search). But this approach to Fourth
Amendment issues has its own problems, as Justice Breyer knows. See Bond v.
United States, 529 U.S. 334, 342 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (complaining that
the Court's ruling on whether an officer's squeeze of luggage constitutes a search
complicates "already complex Fourth Amendment law, [and] increas[es] the difficulty of deciding ordinary criminal matters, and hinder[s] the administrative guidance (with its potential for control of unreasonable police practices) that a less
complicated jurisprudence might provide"); see also, Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-ByCase Adjudication" versus 'Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974
Sup. CT. REv. 127, 141 ("A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts
of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline
distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be 'literally impossible of application
by the officer in the field.') (footnote omitted).
29 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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Kyllo's preference for drawing a firm and bright line at the
entrance to the house is equally applicable in McArthur: Absent exigent circumstances, police officers should not be allowed to disturb an individual's right "to be secure" in his home
without a warrant. Although both cases involve the sanctity
and security of a private home, the choice to employ a per se
rule in Kyllo and a balancing test in McArthur, is not explained
by the Court nor deciphered by examining the Court's relevant
precedents.
C. Kyllo's Emphasis on the Home
The third and final reason to question Kyllo's long-term
impact for protecting Fourth Amendment rights, ironically,
concerns Kyllo's strongest feature: its emphasis on the
home.29 ' The driving force of Justice Scalia's opinion was that
a thermal imager discloses information regarding the interior
of a home. 92 While Justice Scalia willingly conceded that the
291 In his article on Kyllo, Professor Seamon describes Kyllo as an important

case and also highlights the Court's emphasis on the home. See Richard H.
Seamon, Kyllo v. United States And the Partial Ascendance of Justice Scalia's
Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 1013 (2001). According to Professor Seamon,
Kyllo is a significant ruling, in part, "because it reinforces the narrowing of the
once broad warrant presumption in two ways. First, by departing from the reverse Katz test [the tendency by the Court to find that government conduct is not
a search for Fourth Amendment purposes], Kyllo may block future resort to that
test as a means of shoring up the illusion of a broad warrant presumption. Second, Kyllo articulates the new, narrow version of the presumption, under which
the warrant requirement applies most stringently to searches of the home." Id. at
1029. Although Professor Seamon generally applauds the result in Kyllo, a student commentator calls Kyllo "a dangerous opinion" because Justice Scalia:
has crafted an opinion that moves the Court even further in reverse, back
toward a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence based on place. And the only
place that Justice Scalia appears to believe that warrants full protection
is the interior of the home. The test he develops for whether government
use of a technology constitutes a search offers little to no protection to
information generated by new technologies.
Andrew Riggs Dunlap, Fixing the Fourth Amendment with Trade Secret Law: A
Response to Kyllo v. United States, 90 GEo. L.J. 2175, 2176 (2002). According to
Dunlap, Kyllo's "reasoning should produce alarm" because it embraces "a view of
the Fourth Amendment that buckles and gives way once a citizen, or his or her
information, passes outside the home." Id. at 2187, 2189-90. While I agree that in
future cases the Court is likely to read Kyllo's holding narrowly, there is noting in
Kyllo itself that demands this narrow interpretation.
2
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2 ("A thermal imager reveals the relative heat of

2002]

KATZ, KYLLO, AND TECHNOLOGY

challenged intrusion in Kyllo's case involved an insignificant
compromise of a homeowner's privacy,"3 that fact was unimportant. The trivial nature of the intrusion was irrelevant because-from the Founder's era to modern times-private homes
have been protected against warrantless police searches. Thus,
Scalia explained that the Court "must take the long view, from
the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward."2"
This meant that a search warrant was required before police
could utilize a thermal imager to determine the relative heat
that was emanating from Kyllo's home.295
To a certain extent, Kyllo's emphasis on the home is understandable. There are textual, historical and practical reasons
why the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has afforded
the home special protection. Kyllo continues this trend, notwithstanding the limited information that the thermal imaging
revealed. Practically speaking, however, giving special protection to the home, but reduced or no protection to other areas,
may be short-sighted, particularly if the Court is concerned
about technological advances that intrude upon privacy. As
Justice Stevens suggested, if sense-enhancing technology gives
the government "the functional equivalent of access to a private
place," then the reach of the Fourth Amendment protective
umbrella should not be confined to the home.2" Although the
facts in Kyllo did not require the Court to discuss how its analysis might affect other areas and places entitled to constitutional protection, Kyllo's stress on the home may provide a distinguishing point in future cases where the Court has to judge the
use of thermal imaging or similar sense-enhancing equipment
directed at targets other than houses. If the Court's past precedents are predictive of future results, the odds are good that

various rooms in the home. The dissent may not find that information particularly private or important, but there is no basis for saying it is not information
regarding the interior of the home.") (citations omitted).
'
Id. at 40.
294 Id.
2" Id.; see also David 0.

Markus & Mona Markus, The Heat is On: Thermal

Imaging and the Fourth Amendment, THE CHAMPION Dec., 1998, at 22-24 (preKyllo article arguing that the use of thermal imaging requires a judicial warrant).
29
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Kyllo's protective reach will be confined to the home. Indeed,
the facts and holding of United States v. Karo2 9'-another
case involving electronic surveillance-reveals the limits of a
judicial analysis focused on the home and may provide the template for limiting Kyllo.
In Karo, federal drug agents learned that the defendants
had ordered several gallons of ether in order to extract cocaine
from clothing that had been imported into the country. The
agents placed an electronic beeper in a can of ether that was
sold to the defendants.29 Over a four month period, using
both visual and electronic surveillance, the agents tracked the
beeper as it arrived and left several private homes and two
commercial storage facilities. Finally, the agents obtained a
search warrant for a private residence where the beeper-laden
can was located. Inside that home, they found cocaine.299 Two
issues confronted the Court: First, whether installation and
transfer of the beeper-laden can to a buyer unaware of the
beeper's presence triggered Fourth Amendment protection.3"
Second, whether monitoring of the beeper was a search when it
revealed information that could not have been obtained
through visual surveillance."' 1 On the second issue, Karo
ruled that "monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a
location not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth
Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in
the privacy of the residence."0 2

'
29

468 U.S. 705 (1984).
The agents received a warrant for the installation and transfer of the beep-

er-laden can, but that warrant was later invalidated for misleading statements in
the affidavit. Karo, 468 U.S. at 719 n.5.
299

Id.

'00 Id.
'0' Id.

at 708-10.

at 712.
at 714. On the first issue, Karo ruled that installation and transfer of

the beeper-laden can was neither a search nor seizure. Id. No search occurred
because the transfer of an unmonitored beeper "conveyed no information at all. To
be sure, it created a potential for an invasion of privacy, but we have never held
that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches. .. ."
Id. at 712. No seizure occurred either "Although the can may have contained an
unknown and unwanted foreign object, it cannot be said that anyone's possessory
interest was interfered with in a meaningful way." Id.
Id. at 714. The Court explained that beeper monitoring reveals "that a
'"'
particular article is actually located at a particular time" in a home. Id. at 715.
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Seven Justices in Karo agreed that monitoring a beeper in
a private home constitutes a search." 8 The Court was split,
however, over whether monitoring the beeper to determine that
it was located somewhere in a storage facility constituted a
search. Writing for the majority, Justice White explained that
no search occurred because the beeper disclosed only that the
can was "somewhere in the warehouse.""°4 The monitoring did
not "identify the specific locker" which contained the beeperladen can.30 5 Nor did the monitoring reveal anything about
the "contents" of the locker the defendants had rented. 6 Justice Stevens, however, took issue with this conclusion. He noted
the agents were unaware of the beeper's location after its initial entrance into a private home. "From that moment on it was

"Even if visual surveillance has revealed that the article to which the beeper is
attached has entered the house, the later monitoring not only verifies the officers'
observations but also established that the article remains on the premises." Id. at
715.
' Id. at 721. Justice O'Connor, with Justice Rehnquist joining her, stated that
"the mere presence of electronic equipment inside a home, transmitting information to governments agents outside, does not, in and of itself, infringe on legitimate expectations of privacy of all who have an expectation of privacy in the
home itself." Id. at 722 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She relied on White, which
permitted the use of information obtained from within a home by means of a
microphone secreted on a government agent. Id. In O'Connor's view, the crucial
question in Karo is the defendant's interest in the container in which the beeper
is placed. Id. at 724. "When a closed container is moved by permission into a
home, the homeowner and others with an expectation of privacy in the home
itself surrender any expectation of privacy they might otherwise retain in the
movements of the container-unless it is their container or under their dominion or
control." Id. (footnote omitted). According to Justice O'Connor, the beeper "transmitted information about the location, not the contents, of the container. .. . By
giving consent to another to move a closed container into and out of the home
the homeowner has effectively surrendered his privacy insofar as the location of
the container may be concerned, or so we should assume absent evidence to the
contrary. In other words, one who lacks dominion and control over the object's
location has no privacy interest invaded when that information is disclosed." Id.
at 727.
304Id. at 720.
30 Id.
31 Id. After the beeper monitoring revealed that the can was located in the
storage facility, the locker containing the beeper-laden can was "identified only
when agents traversing the public parts of the facility found that the smell of
ether was coming from a specific locker." Id. at 720-21.

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 72

concealed from view."30 7 The agents discovered the beeper's
location in the storage facility by electronic surveillance." °
"Without the beeper, the agents would have never found the
warehouse ....."0 Thus, Stevens concluded that because the

monitoring "enabled the agents to learn the location of personal
property otherwise concealed from public view," it was a
search.1l
The contrasting opinions of Justices White and Stevens
illustrate the limits of a judicial analysis that emphasizes the
home. According to the Karo majority, police may use electronic
beeper surveillance free of constitutional scrutiny provided the
monitoring discloses only "the general vicinity, and not the
precise private location, of the [beeper]. " 311 Justice White's

judgment that "general vicinity" monitoring is not a search
might not bother an agoraphobe, but it is an odd way to construe the Fourth Amendment, which protects other places and
effects beside houses. Justice White is understandably concerned that "[iindiscriminate monitoring of property that has
been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious
a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely
some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight."312 But does the
exact same "[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has
been withdrawn from public view" not present a similar serious
threat to privacy interests when that surveillance reveals that
property is located at a commercial storage facility, college
campus or hotel resort? The fact that the indiscriminate monitoring did not identify the specific locker containing the property is beside the point. "The property was concealed from public
view; its location was a secret and hence by revealing its location the beeper infringed an expectation of privacy."313 Under
Justice White's view, police are free to install covert electronic
tracking devices on any item available for commercial pur-

"'

Karo, 468 U.S. at 735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

38 Id.
309
310
3'
51
313

Id. at 735 n.11.
Id. at 734-35.
Fishman, supra note 160, at 342.
Karo, 468 U.S. at 716 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 735, n.ii (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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chase, for example, a book, suitcase or rental car. If later monitoring reveals that the property is located at a certain hotel
resort or on a particular college campus, no search occurs provided the monitoring does not identify the specific room in
which a person is staying.3 14
It may be possible in future cases to distinguish the thermal imaging directed at a home from thermal imaging directed
at an office or other business facility.315 Similarly, the Court

"" See Fishman, supra note 160, at 345. Professor Fishman recognizes that
under Karo's logic,
it would appear that so long as the monitoring does not disclose conclusively which of two or more private locations (houses, hotel rooms, lockers, automobile trunks, or whatever) contains the beepered object, monitoring the beeper does not constitute a search. Such a rule would significantly diminish the privacy-enhancing impact the Court's holding in Karo
that private location monitoring constitutes a search.
Fishman, supra note 160 at 345 (footnotes omitted). Interestingly, Professor
Fishman criticizes Justice Stevens' conclusion that a search occurred when the
agents in Karo utilized monitoring to determine that the beeper-laden can was
located somewhere in the storage facility. According to Professor Fishman, this
view "sweeps too broadly." Fishman, supra note 160, at 342. Professor Fishman
explains:
Had the agents maintained visual surveillance of the first storage facility,
they could have observed the suspects transfer the ether from the first to
the second warehouse. Further, upon learning that the ether had been
removed from the first facility, the agents could have interviewed personnel at every other storage facility in Albuquerque until, with luck they
found the warehouse in question. Alternatively, in theory, an informer
might have learned of the ether's new location and reported it to the
authorities. Any of these techniques would have "enabled the agents to
learn the location of property otherwise concealed from public view," yet
none of them would have "infringed upon a privacy interest protected by
the Fourth Amendment." Why should using a beeper, to determine only
the general vicinity to which the ether had been moved, be regarded
differently? Justice Stevens enunciates no persuasive reason.
Fishman, supra note 160, at 342-43 (emphasis added). Professor Fishman's criticism
of Justice Stevens resembles the reasoning of Knotts. In Knotts, the Court concluded that because officers "could have" observed the defendant as he traveled across
the highways of Minnesota and Wisconsin, the Fourth Amendment does not bar
the use of electronic surveillance equipment to allow the police to do the same.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (emphasis added). The problem
with both Knotts's reasoning and Professor Fishman's analysis is that they each
prove too much. As noted earlier, see notes 164-74 and accompanying text, one can
always imagine methods in which police are able to detect useful information.
"' In recent years, the Court has authorized warrantless and suspicionless
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may treat thermal imaging or other scientific searches of vehicles differently from the search in Kyllo. 16 Automobiles are
entitled to a lesser degree of privacy than that given to houses.
Therefore, a thermal imaging "search" or similar intrusion
directed at a vehicle might not trigger Fourth Amendment
protection, even though the intrusion reveals information "that
would previously have been unknowable without [a] physical
intrusion."1 7 By combining the Court's judgment that vehicles
are afforded diminished privacy protection, Karo's conclusion
that general vicinity monitoring is not a search, and Kyllo's
emphasis on the home, an analytical framework emerges that
permits the Court to find that thermal imaging of targets other
than houses does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

searches of business offices and other premises on the basis of grounds that
would not allow searches of homes. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691
(1987) (upholding warrantless, suspicionless search of automobile junkyard business on "special needs" theory); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (searching of government employee's office assessed under "special needs" model; validity
of the search "should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances"); but cf. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (invalidating warrantless search of business).
316 See, e.g., Dery, supra note 242, at 403. Professor Dery describes the
many
uses of the Enclosed Space Detection System (ESDS).
The ESDS, or heartbeat detector, is a surveillance tool designed to detect
the presence of people 'hiding in enclosed spaces of vehicles' by identifying
the presence of a 'human ballistocardiogram.' With each beat of the human heart, a ballistocardiogram or a small mechanical shock wave propagates through the body. This shock wave, in turn, causes the entire vehicle holding the person to vibrate 'at a frequency dissimilar from any other
source.'
Dery, supra note 21, at 653 (footnotes omitted).
317 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). Karo's holding does
not
resolve whether electronic detection of an item concealed inside a vehicle constitutes a search. Professor LaFave explains that there is some "uncertainty" about
the scope of Karo's reach. LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 653. (noting that the Court
initially frames the issue in broad terms as to "whether the monitoring of a beeper [is a search] when it reveals information that could not have been obtained
through visual surveillance," but later in its opinion narrowly frames the issue as
to "whether the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open
to visual surveillance" is a search) (emphasis added). According to Professor
LaFave, Karo could be read to mean that beeper surveillance that reveals that a
container is concealed inside a vehicle or other private location still amounts to a
search, even though the surveillance is not directed at a private residence.
LAFAVE, supra note 21, at 653.
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In sum, Kyllo is an important ruling that expands Fourth
Amendment protection. But Kyllo's impact on future cases
involving the Fourth Amendment and technology, beyond its
limited fact pattern, is uncertain. If Karo's reasoning on general vicinity monitoring is followed in future cases, the holding of
Kyllo is unlikely to prevent government officers from using
sophisticated technology to monitor or reveal information that
is otherwise not exposed to public view.
IV. CARNIVORE MEETS KYLLO
As noted above, Kyllo's long-term impact on search and
seizure doctrine is uncertain. On the one hand, Kyllo may provide significant protection against future technological intrusions. In addition to reaffirming the principle that Fourth
Amendment protection does not require a physical intrusion
into the home-a rule often ignored in previous cases involving
technological intrusions-Kyllo also rejected the claim that disclosure of intimate details was necessary before a government
intrusion would be deemed a search.3 1 s After Kyllo, all details
regarding the interior of the home are constitutionally protected "because the entire area is held safe from prying governmental eyes. "39

On the other hand, Kyllo's protective impact may be blunted in future cases. Kyllo's logic undercuts the holding in Smith
v. Maryland and suggests that a dog sniff of a home is a search
notwithstanding the contrary implication coming from Place. In
light of the tension between Kyllo and these cases and because
the Court is unlikely to overrule Smith or limit the logic of
Place to luggage and automobiles, Kyllo's holding may be confined to thermal imaging intrusions. Moreover, there is nothing
in the Kyllo opinion that commits the Court to using "bright
line" rules in future cases involving technological intrusions
affecting the home. Finally, because Kyllo emphasized the
traditional protection afforded private homes, it will be easy to
distinguish Kyllo where technological intrusions do not target

ala Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
'a'

Id.

at 37.
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houses. Logically, the rule announced in Kyllo should "protect
individuals from the overly intrusive use of sense-enhancing
equipment" in other areas entitled to constitutional protection.3" Yet, if the analysis of Karo-which Kyllo cites approvingly-is followed in future cases, Kyllo's holding will not cover
sense-enhancing equipment that reveals private information in
protected areas outside of houses.
A possible test of Kyllo's strength (or weakness) may come
soon. The Court has not addressed the constitutional status of
e-mail communications, and lower court rulings on the subject
are sparse. 2 1 Normally, the Court is reluctant to address an
issue that has not been percolating in the lower courts.32 2
However, the constitutional questions surrounding Carnivore,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's controversial Internet
surveillance program, may require the Court to address the
constitutional status of e-mail communications coming from a
home computer. If such a case arises, the Court may be confronted with a conflict between Kyllo's holding and the
government's claim that certain applications of Carnivore do
not constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment. 3
Id. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3

See Peter J. Georgiton, The FBI's Carnivore: How Federal Agents May Be

Viewing Your Personal E-Mail and Why There Is Nothing You Can Do About It,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1831, 1838 (2001) (noting that the Court has not determined
whether there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy in our personal home e-mail
accounts, and there is little case law directed to the issue as well').
'1 See Sup. CT. R. 10; ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
228 n. 18 (8th ed. 2002) ("In some cases the Justices may feel that the time is
not ripe for the Court to resolve a conflict, preferring to await further litigation
that might produce a consensus or a satisfactory majority view among the lower
courts."); id. at 230 (quoting Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)) (addressing "'those of my Colleagues
who agree with me [on merits of issue] but believe that this Court should postpone consideration of the issue until more state supreme courts and federal circuits have experimented with substantive and procedural solutions to the
problem').
"' See Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's "Carnivore" Program:
Hearing Before the House Subcomr. on the Constitution, House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of Donald
M. Kerr, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) ("We do, in fact,
have legal authority to do what we are doing today, and I think it is because of
the correct belief, from my perspective, that the addressing information on the
Internet is, in fact, a useful and appropriate analog to the telephone number in
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The exact contours and capabilities of Carnivore are still
subject to debate."2 Briefly stated, Carnivore is a computerbased search program that allows the FBI to intercept electronic communications that travel on the internet. 25

the switch circuit world."); The 'Carnivore' Controversy. Electronic Surveillance and
Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Senate Hearingl (statement of Kevin DiGregory,
Deputy Associate Attorney General Department of Justice) ("We don't think that
there should be a different standard for the interception of e-mails versus the interception of telephones--excuse me; I used the word "interception"-for a pen
register or a trap and trace for e-mails as opposed to a pen register or trap and
trace for telephones.").
" See Maricela Segura, Note, Is Carnivore Devouring Your Privacy?, 75 S.
CAL. L. REv. 231, 233 (2001) (noting that even "after independent review of Carnivore, questions linger about the program's actual capabilities").
' For a comprehensive description of Carnivore, see ILLINOIS INSTITuTE OF
TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Independent Review of the Carnivore System,
Final Report (Dec. 8, 2000, at vii, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ publications/carniv-fmal.pdf ("Carnivore is a soft-ware based tool used to examine all
Internet Protocol (IP) packets on an Ethernet and record only those packets or
packet segments that meet very specific parameters.") [hereinafter IITRI REPORT];
see also Ku, supra note 1, at 1355 ("Like an information roadblock, [Carnivore]
screens all traffic, but pulls over only the data packets it has been programmed
to capture."); Trenton C. Haas, Note, Carnivore and the Fourth Amendment, 34
CONN. L. REv. 261, 271 (2001) ("Carnivore is an Internet surveillance system or
diagnostic tool, which-when equipped with special filtering software-gathers
informational packets traveling over a network"); Neil King Jr. and Ted Bridis,
FBI's Wiretaps To Scan E-Mail Spark Concern, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3
(describing Carnivore as "[eissentially a personal computer stuffed with specialized
software, Carnivore represents a new twist in the federal government's fight to
sustain its snooping powers in the Internet Age. [Carnivore] can scan millions of
e-mails in a second.. ."); Ted Bridis and Neil King Jr., Carnivore E-Mail Tool
Won't Eat Up Privacy, Says FBI, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2000, at A28 ("The system belongs to a class of tools known as 'packet filters' or 'sniffers,' which look
for parcels of data that travel across a network and compromise an e-mail or a
visit to a Web site. Using a Windows screen, Carnivore also can be set to capture
file downloads and chat-room conversations. It can grab e-mail from the most
popular Web-based companies, including Yahoo! Inc. and Microsoft Corp.'s
Hotmail. And once it is installed at an Internet service provider, the FBI can dial
into Carnivore to make changes and monitor data that have been collected."). The
IITRI's REPORT on Carnivore, which was intended to address the complaints of
civil libertarians and computer privacy advocates, was criticized by another group
of experts. See Haas, supra note at 276 (explaining that "a five member team of
renowned researchers and academicians" selected by the chief scientist at the Justice Department "harshly criticized the IITRI's review for what they considered
'continued' and 'serious concerns relating to Carnivore's system.') (footnotes omitted).
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[Carnivore] enables the FBI to conduct a one-way tap into an
Ethernet stream-the flow of electronic impulses carrying
communications through an internet connection. This method
allows investigators to search out keywords, e-mail addresses
or internet protocol ("IP") addresses-a series of numbers and
letters that correlate to websites. Carnivore can conduct at
least two types of searches. First, installed on an ISP's
[internet service provider] network, Carnivore can monitor
and record the full content of messages that a targeted user
has sent in real-time. This real-time, full-content search is
conducted under the same basic legal structure that is employed for telephone wiretaps. Second, Carnivore is reportedly
able to acquire the address information for the origin and the
destination of all communications to and from a particular
ISP customer. This function provides the TO and FROM addresses on an e-mail and is viewed as the electronic equivalent of a telephone pen-register or trap and trace search."s

The following law review articles have assisted me in understanding how
Carnivore works, and have helped to identify the federal statutes that control
various applications of Carnivore to electronic communications. Anthony E. Orr,
Note, Marking Carnivore's Territory: Rethinking Pen Registers on the Internet, 8
MICH. TELEcOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 219 (2002); Peter J. Georgiton, Note, The
FBI's Carnivore: How Federal Agents May Be Viewing Your Personal E-Mail and
Why There Is Nothing You Can Do About It, 62 OHio STATE L. J. 1831 (2001);
Trenton C. Haas, Carnivore and the Fourth Amendment, 34 CONN. L. REV. 261
•
(2001); Manton M. Grier, Jr., The Software Formerly Known As "Carnivore".
When
Does E-Mail Surveillance Encroach Upon a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 52
S.C. L. REV. 875 (2001); Frank J. Eichenlaub, Carnivore: Taking a Bite Out of the
Fourth Amendment, 80 N.C. L. REV. 315 (2001); Maricela Segura, Note, Is Carnivore Devouring Your Privacy?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 231 (2001); Thomas R. McCarthy, Don't Fear Carnivore: It Won't Devour Individual Privacy, 66 Mo. L. REV.
827 (2001); Peter J. Young, The Case Against Carnivore: Preventing Law Enforcement from Devouring Privacy, 35 IND. L. REV. 303 (2001); Sandy D. Hellums,
Bits and Bytes: The Carnivore Initiative and the Search and Seizure of Electronic
Mail, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827 (2001); Matthew Mickle Werdegar, Lost?

The Government Knows Where You Are: Cellular Telephone Call Location Technology and the Expectation of Privacy, 10 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 103 (1998); Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 75 (1994) (pre-Carnivore article discussing the constitutional and statutory issues surrounding stored and transmitted computer data). For a comprehensive and insightful article on the interplay between Fourth Amendment protection
and various statutes designed to protect informational privacy, see Daniel J.
Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1803 (2002).
Segura, supra note 325, at 234 (footnotes omitted). A "trap and trace"
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This final section will examine what impact Kyllo's holding will
have for the27 second type of intercept Carnivore performs-its
"pen mode"' application. Specifically, has a search under the
Fourth Amendment occurred when the FBI employs Carnivore
to intercept and record the routing and addressing information
of e-mails sent from home computers?
A. Is E-mail Addressing Information
Comparable To Telephone Numbers?
Justice Department officials have told members of Congress that Smith v. Maryland authorizes federal agents to use
Carnivore's pen mode application without triggering Fourth
Amendment protections."2 According to this interpretation,

search occurs when an electronic device is installed to "capture[ I the incoming
electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number' of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted.
18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) (1994). As another commentator has noted, the FBI "describes
Carnivore as something of a magic wand, which, when 'waved' over large volumes
of e-mail, can be used to identify and separate targeted e-mails from non-targeted
messages without violating the rights of those who use e-mail for lawful purposes." Eichenlaub, supra note 325, at 317.
"' Under the "pen mode" or pen register mode, Carnivore "can collect header
information such as the 'To:' and 'FROM:' addresses from e-mails and the IP
addresses of computers in FTP [File Transfer Protocol] or HTTP [Hypertext
Transfer Protocol] transactions." Orr, supra note 325, at 223 (footnote omitted);
see also, Georgiton, supra note 325, at 1842 (noting that "Carnivore can be set to
retrieve only information concerning where an outgoing e-mail was sent, where an
incoming e-mail was sent from, and the e-mail address itself') (footnote omitted);
IIITRI REPORT, supra note 325 at ix ("In pen mode, the operator can see the TO
and FROM e-mail addresses and the IP addresses of computers involved in File
Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) sessions.").
" See House Hearing, supra note 323 (statement of Kevin DiGregory, Deputy
Associate Attorney General Department of Justice) (responding to a question from
Representative Jerrold Nadler that this information could be obtained without
probable cause, DiGregory stated: "That's correct, and I want to point out to you
that the Supreme Court held in Maryland v. Smith, I believe in 1979, that there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers dialed by a telephone because essentially, when someone turns over information to a third part like the
telephone company, they should not have either a subjective or an objective reasonable expectation of privacy in that information"). In responding to a question
from Senator Leahy, which essentially asked if the use of Carnivore crossed the
lines established in Smith v. Maryland, Donald Kerr responded:
[Wie believe that such URL information is essentially identical to a tele-
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federal agents "use Carnivore to conduct pen register searches
because they believe that the addresses found in the TO and
FROM lines of an e-mail are the electronic equivalent of the
numbers dialed on a telephone."" Under Smith's reasoning,
a telephone pen register is not a search because a pen register
"do[es] not acquire the contents of communications"3 3 ° and because a telephone user has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the numbers dialed. By using his telephone and voluntarily
conveying numerical information to the telephone company, a
homeowner "assume[s] the risk that the company would reveal
to police the numbers he dialed."33 '
The Justice Department's view that Smith authorizes application of Carnivore's pen mode without implicating Fourth
Amendment safeguards has not been fully tested in the federal
courts.3 2 As one commentator has noted, "[o court has taken the inferential step and applied the Smith rule regarding
the apprehension of telephone numbers to the apprehension of

phone number within a telephone networks that a criminal may dial.
Thus, it is worth noting that a Carnivore-based pen register would provide the FBI with virtually the same information as a telephone pen
register would, i.e., the telephone number dialed by the criminal subject
reflecting that a communication to XYZ Corp. had occurred. No "content"
information (substance, purport or meaning) is gleaned from either type of
pen register as to the nature of the call.
Senate Hearing, supra note 323 (statement of Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
'
Segura, supra note 325 at 262 (footnote omitted); see also Georgiton supra
note 325 at 1842 ("The FBI contends that, consistent with Smith, they can retrieve [information concerning where an outgoing e-mail was sent, where an incoming e-mail was sent from, and the e-mail address itself] without need for a
warrant.") (footnote omitted).
81
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
.31Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
" See generally Haas, supra note 325, at 281-84 (summarizing federal appellate court rulings finding that persons were not entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection when using internet systems privately maintained by their employer or
where the government seized messages found on a chat room that was open to
the public, and explaining that these rulings "are considerably different from a
situation involving the use of Carnivore by the FBI to intercept Internet e-mail
messages from one individual to another"). United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406
(C.A.A.F. 1996), which one commentator described as "[tihe leading case addressing the issue of privacy in personal e-mail accounts," see Georgiton, supra
note 325, at 1839, did not consider the status of e-mail addressing information.
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e-mail addresses through electronic surveillance."3 ' But this
same writer also acknowledged that federal judges have not
been eager to include e-mail addressing information under the
Fourth Amendment's protective scope. Federal judges "while
not explicitly considering whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the addressing information for their email, have been largely reluctant to consider anything beyond
the content of electronic communications in their Katz (reasonable expectation of privacy) analysis.""s4
Although the lower federal courts have not yet endorsed
the Justice Department's position that application of
Carnivore's pen mode to e-mail messages sent by or to home
computers is authorized by Smith, academic commentators
have reached divergent conclusions on the constitutionality of
Carnivore's pen mode intercept. As an initial matter, several
writers have acknowledged the uncertainty of Smith as applied
to e-mail addressing information. For example, one student
commentator acknowledges that the "language of Smith v.
Maryland makes it difficult to conclude definitively whether
Internet users hold any reasonable expectation of privacy in email addressing information."335 Nevertheless, this writer con-

"'
Georgiton, supra note 325, at 1843. But cf., Haas, supra note 325, at 289
(describing an unreported and sealed ruling of a United States Magistrate which
.concluded that the FBI's proposed activities to intercept e-mail information was
the function equivalent of capturing telephone numbers with a pen register or
trap and trace device") (footnote omitted).
'" Georgiton, supra note 325, at 1843 (footnote omitted). Although reported
rulings on the constitutional status of e-mail addressing information have been
rare, federal courts have often rejected claims that e-mail users' subscriber information is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. Subscriber information typically includes an internet user's name; billing address; home, work, and fax numbers; and other billing information that is given to an internet service provider.
Several federal courts, relying on Smith, have ruled that this information is not
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection because individuals have no legitimate
privacy interest in the account/subscriber information given to the ISP to establish an e-mail account. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F. 3d 325, 336-37 (6th Cir.
2001); United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *11-12 (4th
Cir. Aug. 3, 2000); United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330, 333 (N.D. N.Y.
2002); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000).
" Orr, supra note 325, at 226; see also Haas, supra note 325, at 290 ("At the
outset, this Comment sought to establish whether Carnivore violated the
Constitution's Fourth Amendment. Yet, after analyzing the issue, a yes or no
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cludes that e-mail users do not have a constitutionally protected interest in e-mail addressing information. E-mail users have
no subjective expectation of privacy because "they certainly
know that addressing information is being 'conveyed' to their
ISP, if for no other reason than to route their messages to the
proper destination. "
Moreover, because e-mail messages are
typically stored on an ISP's computer equipment both before
and after the recipient receives the message, users "know ISP's
possess 'facilities for recording' e-mail addressing information."3 7 This writer also contends that no objective expectation of privacy exists in e-mail addressing information because
the assumption of risk rule of Smith covers such information.
Just as a person assumes the risk that the phone company will
reveal to the police the numbers he dialed from his home telephone, a computer user assumes a similar risk by voluntarily
conveying e-mail addressing information to an internet service
provider. "A Carnivore installation on the ISP network simply
facilitates this 'revelation' by the ISP."3"

answer is simply not possible. The issue is far more complex."); Segura, supra
note 325, at 258 (noting that "there remains a constitutional question as to
whether there is an expectation of privacy in e-mail, or whether it is a transactional record in the hands of a third party"); Georgiton, supra note 325, at 1842
(noting that Smith's holding "suggests that the FBI does not need a warrant in
order to get the addressing information from someone's e-mail account") (emphasis
added). See also ROSEN, supra note 178 at 70-78. Professor Rosen notes:
Personal e-mail poses something of a constitutional puzzle: on the
hand, it sometimes originates from work, which is not a place that
Fourth Amendment reserves for special constitutional protection; on
other hand, it seems analytically similar to a private letter, which is
of the 'papers' at the historical core of the Fourth Amendment.

one
the
the
one

Id. at 70.
" Orr, supra note 325, at 227.
337 Orr, supra note 325, at 227, quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743
(1979).
Orr, supra note 325, at 229. Another commentator has analogized e-mail
addressing information to a traditional mail cover, which is not a search under
the Fourth Amendment. Megan Connor Berton, Home Is Where Your Modem Is:
An Appropriate Application of Search and Seizure Law to Electronic Mail, 34 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 163, 191-92 (1996) ("Just as senders of first class mail have little
expectation of privacy in the information written or displayed on the outside of
an envelope, e-mail users have little expectation of privacy in the address portion
of their communications. This information is needed to deliver the message and,
though often done solely by computer and without exposure to a human eye other
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Other academic commentators have sought to distinguish
Smith by arguing that disclosure of e-mail addressing information reveals more information than a telephone pen register.
Smith emphasized the "limited capabilities" of a pen register," 9 which, unlike a wiretap, had no capacity to disclose the
content of a caller's communications. Carnivore's pen mode, by
contrast, can reveal more information than a traditional pen
register.
Carnivore can be set to gather lists of the individuals a computer user has sent e-mail to and received e-mail from, lists of
the computers the user has transferred files with, and lists of
computers/web-servers accessed by the user in the course of
surfing the Internet. These types of addressing information
reveal much more than a telephone number does.'
Similarly, some legal commentators have also rejected the
argument that e-mail addressing information is not entitled to
constitutional protection because e-mail users knowingly con-

than the recipient's, it is understood that any problems with the address causing
difficulty in delivery may be noted by the system operator.").
139 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
' Georgiton, supra note 325, at 1845-46; see also Segura, supra note 325, at
252 (arguing that the rationale supporting Smith is inapplicable in the electronic
context "because e-mail addresses often do reveal the individuals involved in the
communication, whether the address is a derivation of the individual's name, or
the full name in parenthesis after the address"); Segura, supra note 325, at 262
(noting that "e-mail addresses often reveal the parties who are writing one other,
and there is usually no question about whether the message was completed, as it
is instantaneously sent to an internet mailbox") (footnote omitted); Chris J.
Katopis, "Searching Cyberspace: The Fourth Amendment and Electronic Mail, 14
TEMP. ENVTL. L & TECH. J. 175, 199 (1995) (arguing that "where a pen register
and trap and trace device only reveal a telephone number, clearly much more
information is obtained by analyzing the header of e-mail. The header is a portion of the transmission that does contain content"); cf., Orr, supra note 325, at
231 (conceding that "it appears e-mail addressing information often does reveal
more about the identity of the sender and receiver than the ten simple digits of a
telephone number," but concluding "it is unclear whether e-mail addresses really
reveal that much more about the identity of message senders and recipients")
(emphasis added); Skok, supra note 25, at 75-79 (arguing that, although Web
users reveal clickstream data to third parties, Smith's assumption of risk theory
should not apply to clickstream data because the clickstream reveals "a record of
a person's cyberspace activity, [which] allows officers to entirely recreate an online
experience").
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vey that information to a third party. They argue that Smith's
assumption of risk rule should not apply to electronic communications because ISP employees sign employment agreements
promising not to read or disclose private e-mail, and federal
law does not authorize such disclosure." Under this view, email users "should have an [objective] expectation of privacy in
their
" 342 electronic communication, even if saved on a remote server.

Given the logic of Smith, the Court is unlikely to recognize
a constitutional difference between e-mail addressing information and the information that a telephone pen register reveals.
Like a traditional pen register, Carnivore's pen mode does not
disclose the content of e-mail messages." 3 To be sure,

3'

See Segura, supra note 325, at 253; cf, 1 LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 2.6 at

120 (noting arguments that "computer operators have no legitimate purpose in
reading records unrelated to the operator's function, just as the telephone company has no legitimate purpose in listening to the contents of conversations,' and
thus the user does have a legitimate expectation of privacy as to 'the contents of
electronic mail messages or personal files.' This is so even when the system manager makes backup copies of such records, and even when the users are all employees of the system operator.") (footnotes omitted).
Segura, supra note 325, at 253.
'
Carnivore's pen mode collects "not only the 'To:' and Trom:' fields of targeted e-mail messages, but also the length of the message and the length of individual fields within those message. In fact, the system captures the entire e-mail
message and all of its fields (including the 'SUBJECT' line contents of the message), but replaces each character in fields other than 'To:' and 'From:' with an
Y_" Orr, supra note 325, at 230. Many writers have asserted that Carnivore's pen
mode reveals more information than a pen register, which thereby distinguishes
the analysis of Smith. See, e.g., Segura, supra note 325, at 262 ("As a basic matter, e-mail addresses often reveal the parties who are writing one other, and
there is usually no question about whether the message was completed, as it is
instantaneously sent to an internet mailbox") (footnote omitted); Georgiton, supra
note 325, at 1845-46 (same); Haas, supra note 325, at 288 (same). For example,
Carnivore can reveal the length of an e-mail message, which discloses more information than a pen register reveals. See, e.g., Orr, supra note 325, at 230;
Eichenlaub, supra note 325, at 330, n.105. This fact probably will not matter to
the Court. Disclosure of the length of an e-mail message without revealing the
contents of that message can be analogized to FBI agents learning the length of a
telephone conversation without learning about the contents of the oral communications. If the pen register in Smith had disclosed the length of the calls along
with the numbers dialed, I doubt that this additional information would have
changed the result in that case. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (noting that subscribers realize "the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the
numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their
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Carnivore's pen mode "does reveal more about the identity of
the sender and receiver than the ten simple digits of a telephone number."' But the revelation of this additional information is probably not enough to persuade the Court that
Smith's reasoning should be abandoned when deciding whether
Carnivore's pen mode intercept constitutes a search. Similar
arguments were raised in Smith to no avail. For example, Justice Stewart's dissent noted that telephone numbers dialed
from a private line "are not without 'content."" 45 A pen register discloses to government officials "the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate
details of a person's life."3 46 In like manner, Justice
Marshall's dissent contended that giving police officials unfettered discretion to employ pen registers jeopardized privacy, as

monthly bills"). Most telephone bills also provide the length of long distance calls.
Therefore, the fact that Carnivore's pen mode reveals the length of an e-mail
message without disclosing its contents is unlikely to affect the Court's determination of whether a search has occurred. One commentator who argues that e-mail
addressing information is not entitled to constitutional protection, nevertheless
disagrees with my assessment that Carnivore's capability to record the length of
an e-mail message will not affect the Court's judgment on the constitutional status of e-mail addressing information. See Orr, supra note 325, at 231-32. This
commentator asserts that the problem of overcollection "may be a fatal constitutional flaw" because, unlike telephone numbers and e-mail addressing information,
"the length of messages and the length of individual fields within those messages
is not regularly collected for any legitimate business purpose." Moreover,
Carnivore's "collection of the entire body of the message in "X" form" creates the
potential for abuse because "if the software can electronically 'redact' a message,
perhaps it could also un-redact it, revealing the full contents." Accordingly, this
writer concludes that Carnivore, as presently programmed, "should not be authorized for use as an Internet pen register." Orr, supra note 325, at 231-32.
While I agree that Carnivore's ability to capture the entire body of an e-mail
message creates the potential for abuse, that fact will not make a difference to
the Court. Long ago, the Court made clear technological devices that present a
risk for invasions of privacy do not, standing alone, trigger Fourth Amendment
protection. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (explaining that the
installation of an unmonitored beeper "created a potential for an invasion of privacy, but we have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of
privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment . . . . It is the
exploitation of technological advances that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not
their mere existence.").
Orr, supra note 325, at 231.
3"
Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
'~Id.

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 72

well as First Amendment, interests.
The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring will
undoubtedly prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many individuals, including members of unpopular political organizations or journalists with confidential
sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disclosure of personal
contacts. Permitting governmental access to telephone records
on less than probable cause may thus impede certain forms of
political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the
hallmark of a truly free society. 47

These arguments did not convince the Smith majority that a
pen register invades a homeowner's privacy when he uses a
telephone,3 48 and there is no reason to think that similar arguments will persuade the Court to discard Smith's reasoning
when determining Carnivore's pen mode intercept constitutes a
search.
Likewise, the Court is unlikely to abandon the assumption
of risk rule when it confronts the constitutional status of e-mail
addressing information. Smith concluded that when a homeowner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to a third
party, he "assumed the risk" that the third party would reveal
that information to the government. As one commentator has
recognized, Smith's logic is equally applicable to e-mail addressing information. 9 It will not matter that ISP employees
"must sign a confidentiality agreement that they will not read

...Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also, David E.
Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REv. 563, 577
(1990) ("The pen register, however, cannot be limited to provide information only
about phone numbers that may relate to criminal activity. Police will learn of all
calls dialed by the suspect, and thus will discover if the suspect has talked to the
girl next door, the local Alcoholics Anonymous hotline, or the national Communist
Party headquarters.").
'
See Werdegar, supra note 256, at 108 (1998)
"' Orr, supra note 325, at 229 ("Substituting the proper e-mail terms into
[Smith's] formula, it becomes clear that e-mail addressing information revealed to
no one other than an ISP's equipment nevertheless falls squarely within the Miller assumption of risk doctrine, as interpreted in Smith."); Ku, supra note 1, at
1356 ("If Carnivore is programmed, for example, to capture the addresses of people with whom an individual is corresponding via e-mail, the analogy to Smith
and the capturing of telephone numbers is even closer.").
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[or disclose] customer communications such as e-mail." 50
Telephone operators presumably operated under similar restraints when Smith was decided, and even if such restraints
did not exist, the employment policies and practices of
telephone companies were irrelevant to the result in Smith."'1
What was relevant in Smith, and will be relevant in a future
case involving e-mail addressing information, is the
homeowner's voluntary decision to convey information to a
third party. Under the assumption of risk theory, the disclosure
of information to a third party denies Fourth Amendment protection to what might otherwise be private information.3 52
In sum, if the analysis of Smith determines the constitutional status of e-mail addressing information, then Carnivore's
pen mode intercept will not be considered a search under the
Fourth Amendment. The two main features that compelled the
Court to find that a pen register was not a search-the nondisclosure of the contents of communications and the fact that
the individual assumed the risk that private information would

Segura, supra note 325, at 253.
In Smith, the defendant argued that he had an expectation of privacy in
the local calls he dialed because telephone companies typically do not record local
calls. The Court concluded that argument lacked any merit:
The fortuity of whether or not the phone company in fact elects to make
a quasi-permanent record of a particular number dialed does not, in our
view, make any constitutional difference. Regardless of the phone
company's election, petitioner voluntarily conveyed to it information that
it had facilities for recording and that it was free to record. In these
circumstances, petitioner assumed the risk that the information would be
divulged to police. Under petitioner's theory, Fourth Amendment protection would exist, or not, depending on how the telephone company chose
to define local-dialing zones, and depending on how it chose to bill its
customers for local calls.. . . We are not inclined to make a crazy quilt
of the Fourth Amendment, especially in circumstances where (as here) the
pattern of protection would be dictated by billing practices of a private
corporation.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
"' See Orr, supra note 325, at 229 ("When an Internet user sends a message
over an ISP's network, she has revealed the addressing information to the ISP's
equipment in the ordinary course of business, and she assumes the risk that the
ISP will reveal her addressing information to the government. A Carnivore installation on the ISP network simply facilitates this 'revelation' by the ISP.") (footnote omitted).
"

"
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be revealed to the government-apply equally to e-mail addressing information. Thus, if Smith's holding is the Court's
"last word" on this issue, the Justice Department correctly
concludes that the FBI is free to use Carnivore's pen mode
intercept without triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
B. Does Kyllo's Holding Cover E-Mail
Addressing Information?
Smith's holding, however, is not the end of the line. The
rule established in Kyllo is pertinent to the constitutional status of e-mail addressing information. Kyllo holds that a search
occurs when government actors acquire by "sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.'""'
If this
standard is applied to Carnivore's pen mode, then intercepting
e-mail addressing constitutes a search.
Carnivore's pen mode enables the FBI to obtain by technology information regarding the interior of the home that could
not otherwise be obtained without physical intrusion into a
home. A pen mode intercept allows FBI agents to monitor information regarding the recipients and senders of e-mail messages sent from or to a homeowner's computer. This information would be unavailable to the government unless FBI agents
were inside the home and had access to a computer user's email account. Moreover, it is obvious that Carnivore is not a
device generally available to the public and that Carnivore's
pen mode provides greater detail about the inside of a home
than a thermal imager, which only reveals the relative amount
of heat escaping from a house. Finally, Carnivore cannot escape
constitutional scrutiny because e-mail addressing information
is available from a third party. Under Kyllo's analysis, Carnivore does not become a non-search merely because the information acquired by a pen mode intercept is obtainable from an
internet service provider."

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35, n.2 ("The fact that equivalent information could
sometimes be obtained by other means does not make lawful the use of means
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In sum, a straightforward application of Kyllo's holding
demonstrates that a search occurs when the FBI employs Carnivore to intercept and record the routing and addressing information of e-mails sent from or to home computers. If the Court
is forced to address the constitutional status of e-mail addressing information, at least two options will be available. The
Court can overrule Smith v. Maryland or confine Kyllo's holding to thermal imaging. The likelihood that Smith will be overruled seems remote, although Kyllo substantially undermines
Smith's legal foundation. As noted above, the analytical framework that dictates the conclusion that thermal imaging is a
search also compels the judgment that a pen register is a
search.
On the other hand, limiting Kyllo to the narrow context of
thermal imaging and not applying its holding to Carnivore is
both unprincipled and perverse. A principled application of
Kyllo would extend to its holding to all places and contexts
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 5 Furthermore,
Fourth Amendment law would be bizarre if Kyllo did not apply
to Carnivore's pen mode. After all, the Kyllo majority was concerned about interpretations of the Fourth Amendment that
would "leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology."" Even commentators who believe that Carnivore can
be re-programmed to comply with Fourth Amendment safeguards, concede that Carnivore, as currently programmed,
reveals more private information than previously permitted
under the Court's precedents.35 7 It would be strange indeed
for the Court to reject a "mechanical interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment" when considering the constitutional status
of a crude device that involves "no 'significant' compromise of
[a] homeowner's privacy,"358 but then put aside its concerns
about "advancing technology" and the privacy of the home
when determining whether Carnivore's pen mode constitutes a

that violate the Fourth Amendment.).
See id. at 48-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 35-36.
U7 See, e.g., Orr, supra note 325, at
231.
Kyllo, 533 U.S at 35 & 40.
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search."5 9
What will the Court do? I predict that the Court will conclude that Carnivore's pen mode does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. The Court can achieve this result by using one of
two modes of analysis. Under the first approach, as suggested,
the Court will confine Kyllo to the context of thermal imaging
and apply the analytical framework of Smith to conclude e-mail
addressing information is not protected under the Fourth
Amendment. If the Court adopts this model, Kyllo, like Katz,
will become a "paper tiger" and will have little impact on the
government's authority to use technology to gather information
or monitor individuals' online activity." °
Under the second approach, the Court can avoid the tension between Kyllo and Smith by relying on its "special needs"
cases to find that Carnivore's pen mode does not violate the
Fourth Amendment. "Special needs" analysis is a fancy way to
describe the balancing test performed by the Court in cases
where the government lacks judicial authority or probable
cause to conduct searches and seizures. 6 1 Indeed, "special

"' The invasiveness of Carnivore's reach has been described elsewhere. See,
e.g., Bridis & King, supra note 325, at A3 (quoting a former prosecutor saying
that Carnivore is "the electronic equivalent of listening to everybody's phone calls
to see if it's the call you should be monitoring. You develop a tremendous amount
of information."); Haas, supra note 325, at 271 (attributing to Richard Forno the
argument that "Carnivore is an electronic eavesdropping device"); Segura, supra
note 325, at 231-32 (noting Carnivore "can conduct a far-reaching, general search
of people who are not subject to a court order," and that many worry that "the
Carnivore system will facilitate a Tishing expedition' in search of any evidence of
crime").
3W See Skok, supra note 25, at 78-79, which argues that if Smith's analysis is
applied to clickstream data, then law enforcement officers will be able to know:
not only what sites [an individual] visited, but also for how long each
was visited, how often each site was re-visited, and which links were
followed from each site. A comparable level of knowledge in the concrete
world would require that the officers know not only which books the
suspect borrowed, but also when she read the books, how long she spent
reading each book and each page, and the sequence in which she read
each book and each page.
Skok, supra note 25, at 78-79.
'6' At its inception, the "special needs" rule was intended as a narrow exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements. "Only in those exceptional
circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court
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needs" analysis may be an enticing framework to determine the
constitutional status of e-mail addressing information because
the Court has already used this doctrine to assess the constitutionality of drug testing programs in various contexts. Urinalysis, of course, is another type of technology that reveals information to the government that would otherwise be unavailable
without the use of intrusive means by government officers.
Since 1989, the Court has decided six cases challenging the
constitutionality of drug testing policies.362 In only two cases,

entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers." New
Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Although
intended as a limited exception, the special needs cases have expanded to the
point where government actors are now permitted to conduct suspicionless searches in various contexts (including scenarios that involve criminal law enforcement)
without establishing a compelling government interest. See JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 338-353 (3d ed. 2002). Professor Dressler
explains that "when the Court determines that 'special needs' exist, it evaluates
the government activity-the special need-by [a] 'reasonableness' balancing standard." Id. at 339. Not surprisingly, "nearly always, the government interest
't mps' the requirements of a warrant and/or probable cause (or reasonable suspicion)." Id. (footnote omitted). On the Constitution's 200th anniversary, Professor
Kamisar explained why the "special" needs doctrine undermines core Fourth
Amendment values:
The handiness of the administrative search concept has gladdened the
hearts of many government lawyers. But it has alarmed other observers,
including me. Today, potential administrative searches are buzzing around
the Fourth Amendment like a swarm of bees. With drug and AIDS testing, the drone may soon grow deafening ....
However great the threat
posed by illicit drug use and the AIDS virus, the 'individualized suspicion'
concept must remain the heart of the Fourth Amendment. I believe we
should greet claims of 'national interest,' 'emergency' or 'necessity' with
considerable skepticism. Slogans like these can be-and have been-a free
people's most effective tranquilizers. As we mark the Constitution's 200th
anniversary, we would do well to remember that.
Yale Kamisar, Drugs, AIDS and the Threat to Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1987,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 109. For more recent academic commentary on the "special
needs" cases, see DRESSLER, supra note 361, at 338, n.1 (citing articles).
" See Bd. of Ed. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002) (approving drug testing of
all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities); Ferguson v.
Charleston, 532 U.S 67 (2001) (invalidating drug testing of maternity patients);
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (invalidating urinalysis requirement for
candidates running for state office); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646 (1995) (upholding random drug testing of public school students who voluntarily participate athletic teams); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989) (upholding drug testing customs officers applying for positions involving
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has the Court invalidated the urinalysis programs on Fourth
Amendment grounds.3" The three main factors considered by
the Court in determining the validity of a drug testing regime
are the nature of the privacy interest, the character of the
intrusion, and the nature and immediacy of the governmental
interests." Applying this framework, the Court could decide
that Carnivore's pen mode intercept constitutes a search, but
the intrusion is conducted in a minimal manner and the
government's need for e-mail addressing information "is important-indeed, perhaps compelling,"' 65 especially if the facts involve a terrorist or national security threat.3"

drug interdiction or requiring the carrying of a firearm or the handling of classified documents); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(upholding drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees following major train
accidents).
" See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81 (ruling unconstitutional drug testing program
of maternity patients suspected of drug use primarily because the main objective
of the testing was to gather evidence for law enforcement purposes); Chandler,
520 U.S. at 318 (invalidating statute requiring drug testing of candidates running
for state office because the state had not demonstrated a substantial problem of
drug abuse to justify a special need for suspicionless searches).
3Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2565-67; Acton, 515 U.S. at 654-664.
31
Acton, 515 U.S. at 661. The drug testing cases illustrate how the Court
often finds that a challenged intrusion constitutes a search, but is nevertheless
constitutionally permissible because the privacy interests and character of the
intrusion are minimal. See, e.g., Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2567 (explaining that
"[gliven the minimally intrusive nature of the sample collection and the limited
uses to which the test results are put, we conclude that the invasion of students'
privacy is not significant"); Acton, 515 U.S. at 658 (noting that "the privacy interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine sample are in our view
negligible"); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 604 (concluding that drug and alcohol testing
procedures "pose only limited threats to the justifiable expectations of privacy of
covered employees").
3W See, e.g., In re: Sealed Case No. 02-001, at 53-55, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (Decided Nov. 18, 2002), available at
http'J/www.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/newsroom/02-001.pdf (relying on the Court's
"special needs" cases as support for different Fourth Amendment requirements
when the government's interest is to protect the nation against terrorist threats
as to opposed to ordinary crime control). In theory, the "special needs" doctrine
does not apply when the search promotes law enforcement interests. For example,
in Ferguson, the Court distinguished a city hospital's drug testing of maternity
patients from previously approved drug testing programs. "In each of those earlier
cases, the 'special need' that was advanced as a justification for the absence of a
warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced from the State's general
interest in law enforcement." Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79. Although "the ultimate
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Based on volume alone, the drug testing cases provide
considerable insight on the Justices' views about the interaction between technology and the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, lawyers and scholars may be better able to predict the
Court's thinking on the "proper analytical structure that should
be employed to reconcile technological change with Fourth
Amendment rights"3 67 by focusing on the Court's "special
need" cases, rather than focusing on Kyllo.
CONCLUSION

The attacks of September 11 had an enormous impact on
Americans' attitudes about law enforcement. After those attacks, President Bush and Congress enacted sweeping legislation designed to protect the nation from future terrorism. Much
of that legislation expands the search and seizure powers of
government. No one should be lulled into thinking that these

goal of the program [in Ferguson] may well have been to get the women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of
the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to
reach that goal." Id. at 83-84 (footnotes omitted).
While the Court asserts that its "special needs" doctrine is inapplicable to
searches that promote law enforcement objectives, its precedents suggest that this
is not always the case. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712-13 (1987)
(applying "special needs" analysis and upholding statute authorizing administrative officers and police officers to conduct suspicionless searches of owners of automobile junkyards); Burger, 482 U.S. at 716 (rejecting claim that an "administrative scheme is unconstitutional simply because, in the course of enforcing it, an
inspecting officer may discover evidence of crimes, besides violations of the
scheme itself'); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (applying "special needs"
analysis and upholding warrantless search of a probationer's home by a probation
officer); cf Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 100 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[SIpecial-needs doctrine was developed, and is ordinarily employed, precisely to enable searches by
law enforcement officials who, of course, ordinarily have a law enforcement objective"); RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 614
(2001) (explaining that New York v. Burger "most clearly illustrates the degree to
which the Court is willing to recognize 'special needs' in contexts where law enforcement interests are clearly also present"); DRESSLER, supra note 360 (acknowledging the "considerable tension between Ferguson and Griffin" on whether the
presence of law enforcement interests eliminates the applicability of the "special
needs" doctrine).
" Brochure Announcing Symposium on April 12, 2002, The Effect of Technology on Fourth Amendment Analysis and Individual Rights, National Center for
Justice and the Rule of Law, The University of Mississippi School of Law.
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expanded powers will be confined to highly-trained FBI agents
investigating international terrorists. Once the judiciary approves additional search and seizure powers for federal agents,
state and local police usually acquire similar authority in their
fight against ordinary crime." Thus, the reaction of the federal judiciary to the government's war on terrorism is likely to
affect the freedom of all Americans.
It may seem unimportant to the non-lawyer whether the
courts consider a particular police practice a "search" or not.
But this perception is dangerous to freedom. Yale Kamisar
rightly observes:
Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and other freedoms,
have earned much praise, and deservedly so, but the Fourth
Amendment may plausibly be viewed as the centerpiece of a
free democratic society. All the other freedoms presuppose
that lawless police action have been restrained. What good is
freedom of speech or freedom of religion or any other freedom
if law enforcement officers have unfettered power to violate a
person's privacy and liberty when he sits in his home or
drives his car or walks the streets?"6
Kyllo is a significant ruling on the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. Although Kyllo's impact on future cases remains
uncertain at this point, the choices available to the Court are
not difficult to imagine. The Court could interpret Kyllo's holding as limited to a privilege against thermal imaging directed
at a home. On the other hand, the Court may recognize that
Kyllo's logic extends to other contexts like e-mail addressing
information. If the Court chooses the former interpretation, the
constitutional freedoms of all Americans will be diminished.

' See William J. Stunz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L. J. 2137,
2140
(2002) (noting that "most constitutional limits on policing are
transsubstantive-they apply equally to suspected drug dealers and suspected terrorists") (footnote omitted).
" Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment And Its Exclusionary Rule, THE

CHAMPION Aug, 1991, at 2.

